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STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS
ON CONCEALED CARRY:
A FIVE-CIRCUIT SHOOT-OUT
Justine E. Johnson-Makuch*
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified a
citizen’s core Second Amendment right to keep a firearm at home; however,
the Court left open the question of how the Second Amendment applies
beyond the home. Since Heller, lower courts have struggled to determine
the constitutionality of concealed carry laws in light of this new
understanding of the Second Amendment.
Many states have enacted laws that restrict a citizen’s ability to obtain a
concealed carry permit, and some of the restrictions are not controversial,
such as the requirements to be above a certain age and have a clean
criminal record. However, concealed carry laws also involve more
contentious requirements, such as New Jersey’s “justifiable need” and New
York’s “good cause” requirements. One concealed carry law reviewed by
lower courts was so restrictive that it amounted to a full ban on carrying
firearms in public. Citizens who have been denied concealed carry permits
challenged the constitutionality of these laws.
This Note summarizes five federal circuits’ decisions regarding such
challenges to statutory restrictions on concealed carry of handguns. Three
of these circuit courts found the laws constitutional, while two held that the
laws were unconstitutional. After this Note considers how each court
reached its decision and why these courts reached differing results, it
ultimately evaluates and critiques the circuit court opinions.
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INTRODUCTION
On a September evening in 2013, two men shot each other dead in Ionia,
Michigan during an escalated instance of road rage.1 One man began
tailgating the other while driving on the highway before the two eventually
stopped in a nearby parking lot.2 They stepped out of their vehicles, pulled
out handguns, and fatally shot each other.3 Police later learned that both
men had valid permits to carry concealed firearms.4 One man’s permit had
been revoked in 2006 after a misdemeanor conviction for driving under the
influence and carrying a firearm in his vehicle; however, he received a new
license in 2010 upon reapplying.5 In Michigan, citizens may be issued a
permit to carry a concealed handgun so long as they are over age twentyone, have taken a gun safety class, and meet various requirements such as
1. Kami Dimitrova, Two Michigan Drivers Shoot and Kill Each Other After Road Rage
Incident, ABC NEWS (Sept. 20, 2013, 4:03 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/
2013/09/two-michigan-drivers-shoot-and-kill-each-other-after-road-rage-incident/.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Hunter Stuart, 2 Concealed Carry Holders Kill Each Other in Road Rage Incident,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 19, 2013, 3:57 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2013/09/19/michigan-concealed-carry-road-rage-two-dead_n_3956491.html.
5. See Dimitrova, supra note 1.
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having no felony convictions or mental illness diagnoses.6 Had the permit
requirements been more restrictive, it is possible neither man would have
been carrying a handgun. Rather, non-permit–carrying Michigan citizens
are required by law to store their firearms locked in a special case in the
trunks of their cars.7
The number of concealed carry permits has grown exponentially in the
past decade. In 1999, there were 2.7 million concealed carry permit holders
in the United States; however, by June 2014, roughly 11.1 million citizens
owned concealed carry permits.8
This dramatic scene illustrates the effect that state-specific concealed
carry requirements can have on preventing confrontations that turn deadly.
An extreme reaction to this incident might be to ban access to firearms
altogether. However, state laws that limit access to firearms typically have
been challenged by citizens in defense of their Second Amendment rights.9
Nevertheless, the laws that enabled these men to carry concealed weapons
had life-ending consequences and thus deserve critical analysis.
This Note reviews how federal circuit courts have analyzed challenges to
states’ statutory restrictions on carrying concealed weapons. Specifically, it
considers how various circuit courts have come to either accept or reject
more stringent requirements for obtaining a concealed carry permit. When
evaluating the constitutionality of a concealed carry law, most courts
employ the same two-prong test;10 however, courts have reached varying
conclusions due to factors such as legislative deference and the stringency
of a particular state’s regulation.
Part I of this Note begins by providing a historical summary of the
Second Amendment as discussed by both legal scholars and the U.S.
Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller.11 This part next examines
the history of concealed carry laws in the United States. It then provides a
snapshot of current state concealed carry laws. Part I concludes by
articulating a two-part test used by courts when evaluating the
constitutionality of a firearm regulation. Part II summarizes three different
conclusions courts have reached when analyzing the first prong of this test:
whether or not the Second Amendment right extends beyond the home.
Part III first identifies the appropriate standard of review when courts
consider a challenge to a state’s heightened requirement for obtaining a
concealed carry permit. It then analyzes a split among five circuits by
evaluating courts’ differing results in their application of the second prong
of the two-step inquiry: whether or not the statute in question survives
under the appropriate level of scrutiny. Part IV evaluates the competing

6. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.425b (West 2012).
7. See Stuart, supra note 4.
8. See CRIME PREVENTION RESEARCH CTR., CONCEALED CARRY PERMIT HOLDERS
ACROSS THE UNITED STATES 5 (2014).
9. This Note will discuss five such challenges, including those against the concealed
carry laws of New York, Maryland, New Jersey, California, and Illinois.
10. See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
11. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
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circuits’ views and ultimately concludes that courts should defer to the
legislature only after exercising critical judgment. This can be achieved by
demanding that the state satisfy its burden of proof by referencing empirical
evidence the state legislature used in making its policy decision.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
AND FIREARM REGULATIONS
This part begins by providing a brief history of the Second Amendment,
referencing both scholarly literature as well as the Supreme Court’s
historical analysis in Heller. This part then reviews the Heller decision
itself, considering both the majority’s and dissent’s conclusions. Next, this
part reviews the history of concealed carry laws, indicating a longstanding
practice of firearm regulation in public. It then surveys current concealed
carry statutes relevant for this Note’s discussion in Part III; these statutes
define specific terms under which citizens may carry concealed weapons.
This part concludes by defining the two-prong test many courts use to
analyze a plaintiff’s challenge to state firearm regulations, including
challenges to state requirements for obtaining a concealed carry permit.
A. Heller and the Historical Basis of the Second Amendment
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.12

Prior to District of Columbia v. Heller, the last time the Supreme Court
interpreted the Second Amendment was in United States v. Miller13 nearly
seventy years earlier. In Miller, the Court held that possession of weapons
is a constitutionally protected right only if it has “some reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.”14
Heller was a pivotal case in that it fundamentally changed the Court’s
orientation toward the Second Amendment. Under Miller, the Second
Amendment afforded protection only for those arms having a nexus to
militia, while under Heller, that nexus became self-defense.15 While Heller
12. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
13. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
14. Id. at 178.
15. Compare id. (holding arms must have a connection to “preservation or efficiency of
a well regulated militia”), with Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (holding individuals have the right to
bear arms in their homes for the purpose of self-defense). In Heller, the plaintiff sought an
injunction against (1) enforcement of the bar on handgun registration, (2) the licensing
requirement that prohibited the carrying of a firearm in the home without a license, and
(3) the trigger-lock requirement that prohibited the use of “functional firearms within the
home.” Id. at 575–76. The District of Columbia’s statute was not an explicit ban on
firearms; however, in practice, the laws barred any citizen from carry a handgun. D.C.
prohibited people from having handguns if the weapons were not registered, and a different
provision of the code prohibited registration of handguns. See D.C. CODE §§ 7-2502.01(a),
.02(a)(4) (LexisNexis 2008). Another provision outlawed the carrying of handguns in public
without a license, but D.C. would not issue licenses. See D.C. CODE § 22-4504(a)
(LexisNexis 2001); Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1554 (2009)
(“It is common knowledge . . . that with very rare exceptions licenses to carry pistols have
not been issued in the District of Columbia for many years and are virtually unobtainable.”
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held that the Second Amendment codified a right to bear arms for the
purpose of self-defense, it quite explicitly limited this holding to the
home.16
In Heller, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of history.17
Ultimately, the key question in the debate was: “Did the Founders seek to
protect the right of citizens to bear arms in a well-regulated militia
controlled by the states, or did they seek to codify the common law right of
self-defense?”18 Thus, understanding the Framers’ rationale for the Second
Amendment and its meaning in the historical setting may help to illuminate
the current firearms landscape.
During the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787, most
delegates welcomed a nationalist model of a stable and strong federal army
as our nation’s primary means of defense.19 The Anti-Federalists advocated
for state control over militias to protect against an overbearing federal
government that could infringe upon individual liberties.20 The Convention
reached a compromise, allowing the states to oversee and train their militias
while reserving power for the federal government to organize and arm the
militias.21 The Second Amendment’s protection of the right to keep and
bear arms was born out of this political debate over federalism versus state
rights.22
Two theories have emerged regarding the type of right secured by the
Second Amendment: (1) the individual rights theory and (2) the collective
rights theory.23 A proponent of the individual rights theory believes that the
Second Amendment’s prefatory clause24 indicates that a militia preserves
(alteration in original) (citing Bsharah v. United States, 646 A.2d 993, 996 n.12 (D.C.
1994))). One critic noted the irony, in that “it is a bit like having a right to free speech, but
being barred from opening your mouth.” Winkler, supra, at 1554.
16. See Heller, 554 U.S at 635; see also Jonathan Meltzer, Open Carry for All: Heller
and Our Nineteenth-Century Second Amendment, 123 YALE L.J. 1486, 1494 (2014).
17. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 595.
18. Saul Cornell & Nathan Kozuskanich, Introduction: The D.C. Gun Case, in THE
SECOND AMENDMENT ON TRIAL: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER 9
(Saul Cornell & Nathan Kozuskanich eds., 2013) [hereinafter THE SECOND AMENDMENT ON
TRIAL].
19. See SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE
ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 39–41 (2006).
20. See id. at 3, 40.
21. See id. at 43 (making the militia a “creature of both the states and the new national
government”).
22. See id. at 41.
23. See id. at 1–2 (“Partisans of gun rights argue that the Second Amendment protects an
individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense, recreation, and, if necessary, to take
up arms against their government. Gun control advocates also claim to have history on their
side and maintain with equal vigor that the Second Amendment simply protects a collective
right of the states.”); Benjamin H. Weissman, Note, Regulating the Militia Well: Evaluating
Choices for State and Municipal Regulators Post-Heller, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3481, 3492–
93 (2014) (noting that the “Second Amendment clearly guarantees some sort of right that can
be enforced by individuals,” but that the conflict is specifically over the scope of that right).
24. The Second Amendment is divided into two clauses: the prefatory clause (“A well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State”) and the operative clause
(“the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed”). U.S. CONST. amend.
II.
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individual liberties more than a standing army does.25 In addition, an
individual rights theorist believes that individuals have a right to keep and
bear arms for many reasons, one of which may be to participate in a
militia.26 Individual rights theorists also argue that the Second Amendment
confers individual rights because both the First Amendment and the Fourth
Amendment, which award individual rights, invoke “the people”
language.27 If one reads the Second Amendment to establish merely the
right of an individual to participate in a militia as opposed to an individual’s
right to keep and bear arms, then Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S.
Constitution28 would essentially place control of militias within the federal
government’s grasp—the opposite of the intended consequence.29
Collective rights theorists would argue that the Second Amendment was
in fact intended to counter congressional power granted by Article 1,
Section 8.30 Therefore, according to the collective rights theory, the right
conferred by the Second Amendment should be viewed as restricting
Congress’s power by providing for a well-regulated militia of the people.31
In the eyes of collective rights theorists, the fact that the Second
Amendment is placed in the Bill of Rights next to the First Amendment is
further evidence that Second Amendment was intended to restrict the power
of Congress rather than the power of states and their respective militias.32
Individual rights advocates, however, substantiate their view with state
court decisions and state legislative actions from the nineteenth century in
which the individual rights interpretation prevails.33 The historical
discussion over individual versus collective rights is unsettled and has
spawned fervent commentary,34 notwithstanding the Supreme Court
majority’s explicit endorsement of the individual rights theory in Heller.35

25. See BRIAN DOHERTY, GUN CONTROL ON TRIAL:
OVER THE SECOND AMENDMENT 9 (2008).

INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT BATTLE

26. See id.
27. See id.
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To provide for
organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may
be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the
Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the
discipline prescribed by Congress.”).
29. See DOHERTY, supra note 25, at 10.
30. See PATRICK J. CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT: THE INTENT AND ITS
INTERPRETATION BY THE STATES AND THE SUPREME COURT 23–24 & n.50 (2009).
31. See id.; see also Petrovski v. Fed. Express Corp., 210 F. Supp. 2d 943, 949 n.5 (N.D.
Ohio 2002) (explaining that because the Second Amendment “applies only to the right of the
State to maintain a militia . . . the Amendment only guarantees a ‘collective’ right rather than
an ‘individual’ right” (citation omitted)).
32. See CHARLES, supra note 30, at 16 (explaining that because “the First Amendment
reads ‘Congress shall make no law’ . . . the [Second Amendment] was initially intended to
be a restriction on Congress, not an individual right” (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I)).
33. See DOHERTY, supra note 25, at 11–13 (citing Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2
Litt.) 90, 91–92 (Ct. App. 1822)).
34. See Cornell & Kozuskanich, supra note 18, at 8 (citing former Chief Justice
Burger’s rejection of the individual rights theory:
“the NRA’s individual rights
interpretation of the Second Amendment ‘has been the subject of the greatest pieces of fraud
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Professor Saul Cornell posits that these categorizations misinterpret
history and that the original understanding of the Second Amendment was a
civic right guaranteeing citizens the ability to keep and bear the arms
necessary “to meet their legal obligation to participate in a well-regulated
militia.”36 In fact, restoring the Founder’s understanding of the Second
Amendment would involve intrusive gun regulation that neither individual
rights nor collective rights theorists would welcome.37
The majority and dissenters in Heller fervently came to opposite
conclusions; both sides operated under the premise that their interpretation
of the amendment was consistent with the original intent of its authors.38
Justice Scalia adopted the individual rights view that the “protected right is
that of individual citizens to keep and bear their privately owned weapons,”
while Justice Stevens’s dissent adopted the collective rights view that the
“protected right is the right of state governments to maintain military
organizations.”39
Scalia’s majority opinion has been hailed as a “triumph of originalism.”40
He invokes the previously articulated argument in which the Second
Amendment confers an individual right because “the people” language
contained in the operative clause appears in other provisions of the
Specifically, the First
Constitution that confer individual rights.41
Amendment’s Assembly and Petition Clause42 and the Fourth
Amendment’s Search and Seizure Clause43 both contain the phrase “the
people” and both “unambiguously refer to individual rights, not collective
rights.”44 The Second Amendment’s prefatory clause containing this
language asserts the purpose of the right’s codification—“to prevent
elimination of the militia.”45 It does not follow, however, that maintaining

. . . on the American public by special interest groups that I have ever seen in my lifetime.’”
(quoting The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour (PBS Television Broadcast Dec. 16, 1991))).
35. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S 570, 628–29 (2008).
36. CORNELL, supra note 19, at 2.
37. Id. (referencing mandatory gun registration, inspection of privately owned weapons
by government officials, requirement that all able citizens purchase personal military-style
assault weapons, etc.).
38. Linda Greenhouse, Sidebar: 3 Defining Opinions, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2008, at
WK4.
39. Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56
UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1348 (2009).
40. Greenhouse, supra note 38. Originalism can be defined as the “original
meaning . . . of the constitutional text [that] is fixed at the time each provision is framed and
ratified.” Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 453, 456 (2013). Judges “ought to be constrained by the original meaning when they
engage in constitutional practice.” Id.
41. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S 570, 579 (2008).
42. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.”).
43. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure . . . against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”).
44. Heller, 554 U.S. at 579.
45. Id. at 599.
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the militia was the only reason Americans valued the right to bear arms.46
Rather, Justice Scalia’s opinion indicates that the prefatory clause confirms
and supports the operative clause,47 which “guarantee[s] the individual right
to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”48
Heller instructs that to discern a right’s original meaning, “we are guided
by the principle that ‘[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the
voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as
distinguished from technical meaning.’”49 The Court clarified that, at the
time of the founding, to “bear” meant to “carry,” not in the ordinary sense
of conveying or transporting an object but to “carry[] for a particular
purpose—confrontation.”50 Several constitutional treatises circulated at the
time of Second Amendment ratification support this “commonsense”
reading of “bear Arms.”51 William Blackstone noted that the “right of
having and using arms for self-preservation and defence” was rooted in “the
natural right of resistance and self-preservation.”52 St. George Tucker, a
law professor and former Anti-Federalist, echoed Blackstone, insisting that
the right to “armed self-defense . . . is the ‘first law of nature,’ and any law
‘prohibiting any person from bearing arms’ crossed the constitutional
line.”53 The Court’s holding that the Second Amendment confers a
personal right to bear arms led to the finding that citizens may possess
firearms in the home for self-defense; this decision is consistent with the
traditionally understood “home-as-castle” theory.54
Stripped to its mere essentials, Justice Scalia’s argument can be
summarized as: the operative clause (“the right of the people”) of the
Second Amendment implies a private right in the same way as it does in the
First and Fourth Amendments.55 Because the other words used in this
operative clause (“keep and bear Arms”) were also used in nonmilitary
contexts and established well before the Bill of Rights, the operative clause
46. See id.
47. See Weissman, supra note 23, at 3492–93 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 598).
48. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592.
49. Id. at 576 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716,
731 (1931)).
50. Id. at 584; see also Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 143 (1998)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
51. Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1154 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Heller,
554 U.S. at 582–83, 592–93).
52. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *144.
53. Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1154 (quoting ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S
COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
289 (1803)).
54. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 943–44 (7th Cir. 2012) (Williams, J., dissenting).
The home-as-castle theory is a metaphor in which “irrespective of actual size or
composition, a person’s residence is considered a fortress that promotes defense against
violent injury.” Mark R. Hinkston, Home Safe Home: Wisconsin’s Castle Doctrine and
Trespasser Liability Laws, 86 WIS. LAW. 18, 20 (2013). This longstanding tradition dates as
far back as Blackstone: the law “has so particular and tender a regard to the immunity of a
man’s house, that it stiles it his castle, and will never suffer it to be violated with impunity.”
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *223.
55. See Lund, supra note 39, at 1348.
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does not restrict the Second Amendment to military purposes.56 In
addition, the prefatory clause (“[a] well regulated militia”) merely explains
why the preexisting right was codified in the Constitution and did not
change the nature of the right to be exclusively militia-related.57
However, many have critiqued Justice Scalia’s opinion, stating that, in
fact, his decision centers on the modern understanding of the Second
Amendment, i.e., the “living Constitution.”58 Ironically, Justice Scalia
acknowledges that interpretation of a living Constitution “allows the
personal value choices of the judge to decide the case and diminishes
respect for the Court.”59 Some go so far as to say that “Heller should be
seen as an embarrassment for those who joined the majority opinion.”60
Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit branded Scalia’s opinion as “faux
originalism.”61 He further asserts that a purely originalist analysis would
have reached the opposite result—that the Second Amendment was largely
concerned with preserving the militia.62 Some members of the judiciary
believe that the historical evidence on both sides of the debate was equally
compelling, so the Court should have deferred to the legislature.63
Some historians have found Justice Stevens’s dissent more persuasive.64
Justice Stevens’s dissent can be summarized as: the term “bear arms” in the
operative clause strongly suggests a military purpose and does not, as the
majority purports, imply a private right for self-defense.65 The prefatory
clause specifying the need to maintain a “well-regulated militia” as well as
the legislative history confirm the exclusive military purpose of the Second
Amendment.66

56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Cornell & Kozuskanich, supra note 18, at 16 (“Scalia embraced a theory of the
living Constitution but dressed it up in originalist clothing.”); Winkler, supra note 15, at
1552–53, 1560–61; see also Pauline Maier, Op-Ed., Justice Breyer’s Sharp Aim, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 22, 2010, at A31.
59. Winkler, supra note 15, at 1558 (citing Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser
Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 854–55, 863–64 (1989)).
60. Lund, supra note 39, at 1345.
61. See Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and Gun
Control, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32, 33.
62. Id.
63. See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95
VA. L. REV. 253, 266–67 (2009). The concept of legislative deference is founded on the idea
that the legislature is in a better position than the judiciary to make “sensitive public policy
judgments.” Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 97 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotations
omitted) (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994)). As such, a
court’s role is only “to assure that, in formulating its judgments, [the legislature] has drawn
reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence.” Id. (quoting Turner, 512 U.S. at 666).
But see infra note 215 (discussing the unreliability of evidence regarding firearm regulation).
64. See Cornell & Kozuskanich, supra note 18, at 12. But see Nicholas J. Johnson,
Rights Versus Duties, History Department Lawyering, and the Incoherence of Justice
Stevens’s Heller Dissent, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1503 (2012) (critiquing Justice Stevens’s
dissent).
65. See Lund, supra note 39, at 1348–49.
66. Id. at 1349.
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Some question whether the Supreme Court’s holding could have been
decided any other way, given that a significant portion of the country
overwhelmingly believes that the Constitution guarantees an individual’s
right to keep and bear arms.67 The Ninth Circuit noted that Heller validated
the Second Amendment’s original meaning in two respects: (1) the right to
keep and bear arms is, “and has always been,” an individual right, and
(2) that this right is oriented to self-defense.68 The Heller decision did
recognize, however, that the “right secured by the Second Amendment
[was] not unlimited” and listed examples of “presumptively lawful
regulatory measures” that restrict possession of firearms under certain
circumstances.69
The Supreme Court’s holding in McDonald v. City of Chicago70 two
years later was a logical outgrowth of the Heller decision.71 The question
presented in McDonald was whether a state government must recognize a
citizen’s Second Amendment right.72 The answer to this inquiry depended
upon whether the right identified in Heller was “deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition” and “fundamental to our scheme of ordered
liberty.”73 Because self-defense had been recognized as a basic right and
Heller determined that this right was the central component of the Second
Amendment guarantee, the McDonald Court determined that both the
federal government and the states, through the Fourteenth Amendment, are
subject to its restrictions.74
The Court in Heller and McDonald never intended to clarify Second
Amendment jurisprudence in its entirety.75 The Court did make clear that
“Second Amendment guarantees are at their zenith within the home.”76
However, Heller left in its wake a considerable degree of uncertainty with
regard to Second Amendment rights beyond the home.77 Both Heller and
McDonald dealt specifically with overturning absolute bans on handguns,
67. See, e.g., Winkler, supra note 15, at 1559–60 (opining that the rule of individual
right is strong precisely because it does not actually exist, and therefore cannot be
repudiated). Popular understanding of the Second Amendment (i.e., an individual right to
bear arms in nonmilitary contexts) is at odds with a longstanding judicial practice of limiting
the Second Amendment right to military use of guns. Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment
Minimalism: Heller As Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246, 252, 269–70 (2008).
68. Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1155 (9th Cir. 2014).
69. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S 570, 626–27 & n.26 (2008) (“[N]othing in
[this] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession
of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”).
70. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
71. See Cornell & Kozuskanich, supra note 18, at 19 (“[T]he notion that incorporation
follows logically from Heller is hard to dispute as a matter of existing legal doctrine.”).
72. See Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1149 (citing McDonald, 561 U.S. at 766–67).
73. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721
(1997); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)).
74. See Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1149 (citing McDonald, 561 U.S. at 748–51).
75. See Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)).
76. Id. (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29).
77. See United States v. Macsiandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 467 (4th Cir. 2011).
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as opposed to the less restrictive regulations dealing with concealed carry at
issue in this Note. The Court left the task of evaluating the constitutionality
of firearm regulations up to the lower courts.
B. History of Concealed Carry Laws
When evaluating the legitimacy of current regulations that restrict
citizens’ ability to carry firearms in public, courts often discuss the
longstanding tradition of states regulating both concealed and open carry in
public for protection of public safety.78 Concealed carry is the wearing of a
firearm under clothing or in a pocket, whereas open carry is visibly
exposing a firearm on a belt holster. While this Note later analyzes lower
court decisions related only to concealed carry laws, both forms of carry are
relevant to the history of firearm regulations.
Some states prohibited public carry of firearms “on certain occasions and
in certain locations” as far back as the Founding era.79 This practice in fact
is a vestige of fourteenth century English law, primarily drawn from the
1328 Statute of Northampton which states in relevant part that “no man
could ‘go nor ride armed by night nor by day, in Fairs, markets, nor in the
presence of the Justices or other Ministers, nor in no part elsewhere.’”80
This statute essentially prohibited being armed in public, regardless of
whether the arms were visible or concealed.81 Leading scholars influential
during the Founding era relied on the Statute of Northampton when
discussing criminal offenses, and states such as Massachusetts, North
Carolina, and Virginia incorporated this statute into their own laws in the
years following the Constitution’s adoption.82 For example, North
Carolina’s statute nearly quoted the Statute of Northampton, prohibiting the
carry of arms during the day and night “in fairs, markets, [and] in the
presence of the King’s Justices, or other ministers, [and] in no part
elsewhere.”83
The early nineteenth century saw an increase in the individualist identity,
with a rise in the number of individuals carrying weapons for selfdefense.84 One journalist attributed the increase of concealed weapons to
the Jacksonian, Anti-Federalist political doctrine that fueled “extravagant

78. See Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 84–85, 95–96, 97; see also Saul Cornell & Nathan
DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The Early American Origins of Gun Control, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 487, 502–16 (2004).
79. Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 95 (citing Patrick J. Charles, The Faces of the Second
Amendment Outside the Home: History Versus Ahistorical Standards of Review, 60 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 1, 31–32 (2012)).
80. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 944 (7th Cir. 2012) (Williams, J., dissenting)
(quoting 2 Edw. III, c. 3 (1328)).
81. See id.
82. See id.; Charles, supra note 79, at 31–32.
83. See Charles, supra note 79, at 32 (citing FRANCOIS-XAVIER MARTIN, A COLLECTION
OF STATUTES OF THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND IN FORCE IN THE STATE OF NORTH-CAROLINA
61 (Newbern 1792)).
84. See CORNELL, supra note 19, at 137.
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notions of ‘personal rights and personal independence.’”85 This rise in
individualism spawned fears that handguns posed a threat to society, so
legislatures enacted the first comprehensive laws limiting handguns and
concealed weapons.86 The first state to have adopted a concealed weapon
statute was Kentucky in 1813, with Louisiana, Indiana, Georgia, Tennessee,
Virginia, and Alabama following soon thereafter.87 During this time, laws
regulating the use of firearms in public “became commonplace and far more
expansive in scope than regulations during the Founding Era.”88 For
example, Georgia “criminalized the sale of concealable weapons,
effectively moving toward their complete prohibition.”89 Virginia’s ban on
concealed carry “explicitly rejected a self-defense exception.”90
These restrictions quickly prompted backlash, producing the “first
systematic defense of an individual right to bear arms in self-defense.”91
The first court to consider the issue of concealed carry regulations held that
restrictions on an individual’s right to keep and bear arms were
unconstitutional.92 The highest court in Kentucky invalidated restrictions
on carrying concealed weapons.93 However, most nineteenth-century
courts found comprehensive restrictions on firearms in public to be
constitutional.94
Some nineteenth-century state courts found that a state may regulate open
carry or concealed carry of handguns but not both. The Supreme Court of
Alabama in State v. Reid95 upheld a prohibition on concealed carrying of
“any species of fire arms” but noted that the state’s regulation of firearms
could not “amount[] to a destruction of the right” to bear arms by also
banning open carry.96 Relying on this finding, the Supreme Court of
Georgia found that the prohibition on carrying concealed pistols was
unconstitutional because the statute “contain[ed] a prohibition against
bearing arms openly” and therefore amounted to a destruction of the right.97
Interestingly, at least four states once banned the carrying of firearms in

85. See id. at 139 (quoting Joseph Gales, Prevention of Crime, in EARLY INDIANA
TRIALS: AND SKETCHES 465, 476 (Oliver Hampton Smith ed., 1858)).
86. See id. at 4.
87. See CLAYTON E. CRAMER, CONCEALED WEAPON LAWS OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC:
DUELING, SOUTHERN VIOLENCE, AND MORAL REFORM 2–3 (1999).
88. Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 95 & n.21 (2d Cir. 2012) (referring
to twenty nineteenth-century state statutes).
89. Id. at 96 (citing Act of Dec. 25, 1837, 1837 Ga. Laws 90, invalidated by Nunn v.
State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846)).
90. Id. (citing ch. 101, 1838 Va. Acts 76).
91. CORNELL, supra note 19, at 138.
92. See Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822).
93. See id.
94. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S 570, 626 (2008); Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at
90.
95. 1 Ala. 612 (1840).
96. Id. at 614, 616.
97. Nunn v. Georgia, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846).
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both a concealed and open manner in public,98 and three of these statutes
survived constitutional challenges.99
The rise of restrictive gun carrying laws may have been fueled, at least in
part, by racial motivations.100 These laws were intended to keep guns out
of the hands of free blacks.101 After the Civil War, significant debate in
Congress and in public discourse took place over “how to secure
constitutional rights for newly freed slaves.”102 Statutes limiting privileges
of constitutional citizenship to newly freed men were largely modeled on
Mississippi’s 1865 “Act to Regulate the Relation of Master and Apprentice
Relative to Freedmen, Free Negroes, and Mulattoes,” which stated in part
that “no freedman, free negro or mulatto . . . shall keep or carry fire-arms of
any kind, or any ammunition.”103 Notwithstanding racial motivations,
courts generally upheld restrictive concealed carry laws in order to promote
public safety.104 Many states in the North did not pass laws regulating the
concealed carry of weapons until the 1920s.105 In 1897, the Supreme Court
granted its stamp of approval on concealed carry laws by finding that “the
right of the people to keep and bear arms . . . is not infringed by laws
prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons.”106
Today, the Ninth Circuit finds that states have the right to “prescribe a
particular manner of carry” and need not allow both open and concealed
carry, but states must make provisions to allow at least one of these
options.107 Providing such wide discretion to the state, however, may in
98. See Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 90–91 (citing Law of Apr. 1, 1881, ch. 96, §§ 1–2, 1881
Ark. Acts 191–92; Law of Dec. 2, 1875, ch. 52, § 1, 1876 Wyo. Terr. Comp. Laws 352; Act
to Preserve the Peace and Prevent Homicide, ch. 13, § 1, 1870 Tenn. Acts 28; Act to
Regulate the Keeping and Bearing of Deadly Weapons, Law of Apr. 12, 1871, ch. 34, § 1,
1871 Tex. Gen. Laws 25 (substantially modified by TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 411.171–
.208 (West 1997)).
99. See, e.g., Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455 (1876); Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165 (1871);
English v. State, 35 Tex. 473 (1871).
100. See CRAMER, supra note 87, at 9.
101. Id. (noting that the location and timing of the concealed carry restrictions suggest
that they were intended for “social control of free blacks”).
102. See Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1161 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 614 (2008)).
103. See Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1161–62 (citing Law of Nov. 22, 1865, ch. 23, § 1, 1866
Miss. Laws. 165). The act was rigorously enforced and led to a “thorough confiscation” of
black-owned guns, “whether found at home or on the person.” Id. at 1162 (citing HARPER’S
WEEKLY, Jan. 13, 1866, at 19, col. 2).
104. See, e.g., City of Salina v. Blaksley, 83 P. 619, 621 (Kan. 1905) (upholding statute);
Fife, 31 Ark. at 461 (upholding statute); Nunn v. Georgia, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846) (upholding
statute); Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 161–62 (1840) (upholding statute); see
also Stephen Kiehl, In Search of a Standard: Gun Regulations After Heller and McDonald,
70 MD. L. REV. 1131, 1135 n.43 (2011) (citing State v. Workman, 14 S.E. 9, 11 (W. Va.
1891) (“The presumption which the law establishes, that every man who goes armed in the
midst of a peaceable community is of vile character . . . is in consonance with the common
law, and is a perfectly just and proper presumption.”)).
105. See CRAMER, supra note 87, at 4.
106. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281–82 (1897).
107. See Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1172 (noting that the state has freedom to decide its
regulatory scheme, “provided that it does not ‘cut[] off the exercise of the right of the citizen
altogether to bear arms, or, under the color of prescribing the mode, render[] the right itself
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fact follow from an unfaithful reading of Heller; according to a recent
article, the historical sources consulted by the Supreme Court in Heller
unequivocally indicate that the Second Amendment protects only open
carry of weapons.108 On the other hand, open carry may not be in line with
today’s custom because many believe open carry incites fear and may
create undue panic.109
Some courts use this rich history of regulating firearms in public to
demonstrate that regulation of concealed carry is a valid state practice
because “states have long recognized a countervailing and competing set of
concerns with regard to handgun ownership and use in public.”110
C. Current State Restrictions on Carrying Concealed Firearms
States greatly differ over the requisite conditions and circumstances
under which citizens may carry a firearm on their person in public. Some
states require a permit to lawfully carry a gun while others allow open or
concealed carry of handguns without a permit.111 In addition, state statutes
vary as to where a handgun may be legally carried.112
States also differ in the amount of discretion given to officials who issue
carry permits.113 The level of discretion is different for “shall-issue” versus
useless.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Nunn, 1 Ga. at 243)); see also Drake v. Filko, 724
F.3d 426, 449 (3d Cir. 2013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting) (“[A]lthough a State may prohibit
the open or concealed carry of firearms, it may not ban both because a complete prohibition
on public carry violates the Second Amendment.”). While only the Ninth Circuit has
explicitly stated this, scholars and prominent gun rights lawyers agree. See Meltzer, supra
note 16, at 1525.
108. See Meltzer, supra note 16, at 1490.
109. See id. While Meltzer notes that open carry may not “jibe with modern
sensibilities,” he ultimately believes that “because the Court has committed to an originalist
methodology for the Second Amendment, complaints about open carry’s [inconsistency]
with modern practice ought to have very little sway.” Id. at 1490–91. Meltzer believes open
carry must be accepted as a consequence of the Court’s method of interpretation. Id. at
1518–19, 1522. Common law tradition (such as North Carolina’s common law rule named
“Going Armed to the Terror of the People”) does in fact indicate that open carry may be
limited because of the terror it incites. See Symposium, Panel Two: Aligning the Sights: A
Practical Discussion on the Accuracy and Clarity of Gun Control, 5 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 247
(2014).
110. Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 96 (2d Cir. 2012). For further
discussion of the Second Amendment’s scope, see Part II.D.1.
111. Compare MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.714 (West Supp. 2014) (requiring a state-issued
permit to lawfully carry a gun), with ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3102, 13-3112 (Supp.
2013) (allowing open or concealed carry of handguns without a permit but also making
available an optional permit).
112. Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1379.3(N)(8) (Supp. 2014) (prohibiting permit
holders from carrying firearms in places of worship), with ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 133102(A)(11) (prohibiting permit holders from carrying firearms in polling places), with
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1277(A)(4) (West Supp. 2014) (prohibiting permit holders from
carrying firearms at professional sporting events).
113. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.425b(7) (West 2012) (stating that county
concealed weapons licensing boards “shall issue” a carry permit to all applicants who meet
stated requirements), with MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131 (LexisNexis Supp. 2014)
(granting local officials broad discretion to issue permits only to individuals they deem
“suitable”).
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“may-issue” states. In shall-issue states, a licensing agent must issue a
permit to an individual who satisfies the requirements articulated in the
state’s statute.114 As of July 2014, thirty-seven states have shall-issue
concealed carry laws.115 In may-issue states, individuals are required to
obtain a concealed carry permit; however, the licensing agent has wide
discretion to deny a permit even if the applicant meets all the requisite
criteria.116 For example, one discretionary determination is that “the
authority believes the applicant lacks good character or lacks a good reason
for carrying a weapon in public.”117 As of July 2014, nine states use mayissue concealed carry laws.118 Only four states allow citizens to carry a
concealed weapon without obtaining a permit or license.119 All of the
statutes discussed in Part IV of this Note, except for Illinois’s, qualify as
may-issue laws.120
State concealed carry laws exist on a spectrum from more restrictive to
less restrictive.121 State legislatures impose certain standards more
frequently than others—eleven states require applicants to demonstrate a
particularized need or a proper purpose as to why the applicant needs a
permit, eight states require that the applicant be of good character, and
about half of all states require an applicant to demonstrate a knowledge of
firearm use and safety.122
Of relevance for this Note are the requirements from the eleven states
that place a heightened burden on applicants to demonstrate a unique reason

114. See Steven W. Kranz, A Survey of State Conceal and Carry Statutes: Can Small
Changes Help Reduce the Controversy?, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 637, 649 (2006).
115. See Concealed Weapons Laws in America from 1981 to Today, LAW CTR. TO
PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, http://smartgunlaws.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/ccwfactsheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2015) [hereinafter Concealed Weapons] (including all
states not mentioned infra note 118 and note 119). In seventeen of these thirty-seven states,
the issuing authority has no discretion to deny a permit to a person who meets these
requirements, but in the other twenty states, authorities have some discretion, such as having
a “reasonable suspicion to believe that the applicant is a danger to self or others.” LAW CTR.
TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, REGULATING GUNS IN AMERICA: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS
OF GUN LAWS NATIONWIDE 218 (2014). This latter group of states falls between the pure
shall-issue and pure may-issue states. See id.
116. Sarah Steers, Survey of State Open and Concealed Carry Laws, JURIST (July 17,
2014, 11:02 PM), http://jurist.org/feature/2014/07/survey-of-state-firearms-laws---dnp.php.
117. LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 115, at 216.
118. See Concealed Weapons, supra note 115 (including Hawaii, California, New York,
Maryland, Delaware, New Jersey, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island).
119. See id. (including Alaska, Arizona, Vermont, and Wyoming).
120. See infra notes 124, 131–32, 136, 138, 144. Illinois’s statute amounted to a
wholesale ban on carrying concealed weapons rather than a set of application criteria.
121. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3112 (Supp. 2013) (allowing concealed carry
permits to U.S. citizens above the age of twenty-one who have not been convicted of a
felony or qualify as mentally ill and who demonstrate proficiency with firearms), with N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-4 (West 2005), § 2C:58-3(c) (West Supp. 2014) (requiring applicant to
demonstrate good character, a justifiable need, no prior history of crime, no dependence on
drugs or alcohol, the issuance of such a permit would not be contrary to public health or
safety, etc.).
122. See LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 115, at 218–20.
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why they are entitled to a concealed carry permit.123 The exact
requirement, whether demonstrating a “justifiable need” or a “proper
cause,” depends upon the particular state’s statutory language. Part III of
this Note analyzes five challenges to the constitutionality of these state
regulations. The state statutes in effect at the time of the respective
challenges are summarized below.
New York’s concealed carry permit law provided: “A license for a pistol
or revolver, other than an assault weapon or a disguised gun, shall be issued
to . . . (f) have and carry concealed, without regard to employment or place
of possession, by any person when proper cause exists for the issuance
thereof.”124 Under New York law, an individual was entitled to a concealed
carry permit, notwithstanding a showing of proper cause, through
employment or place of possession.125 In the context of concealed carry for
self-defense, as opposed to for target practice or hunting, New York courts
defined “proper cause” as a “special need for self-protection distinguishable
from that of the general community or of persons engaged in the same
Proper cause was not satisfied by establishing a
profession.”126
“generalized desire to carry a concealed weapon,”127 or by simply living or
being employed in a high-crime neighborhood.128 Further, licensing
officers had considerable discretion in determining whether proper cause
existed, and this licensing decision was upheld unless found arbitrary and
capricious.129 Additional, less controversial requirements included that the
applicant be over the age of twenty-one, have good moral character, and not
have a history of crime or mental illness.130
Maryland law required that the issuing party first find that the applicant
did not have a disqualifying criminal record, alcohol or drug addiction, or
propensity for violence before issuing a concealed carry permit.131 In
addition, the applicant had to establish a “good and substantial reason to
wear, carry, or transport a handgun, such as a finding that the permit is
necessary as a reasonable precaution against apprehended danger.”132 A
Handgun Permit Unit determined “whether the applicant’s reasons for
seeking a permit ‘[were] good and substantial,’ whether ‘the applicant [had]
any alternative available to him for protection other than a handgun permit,’
and whether ‘the permit [was] necessary as a reasonable precaution for the
123. These states include: California, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Indiana, New Hampshire, and North Dakota. See id. at
218–19.
124. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(2)(f) (McKinney 2008) (emphasis added) (current
version at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(2)(f) (McKinney Supp. 2014)).
125. See id. § 400.00(2)(a)–(e).
126. Klenosky v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 428 N.Y.S.2d 256, 256 (App. Div. 1980).
127. Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
128. Martinek v. Kerik, 743 N.Y.S.2d 80, 81 (App. Div. 2002).
129. See Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 87.
130. See id. at 86 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(1)(a)–(d), (g)).
131. Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 869 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing MD. CODE ANN.,
PUB. SAFETY § 5-306(a)(1)–(5)(i) (LexisNexis 2011) (current version at MD. CODE ANN.,
PUB. SAFETY § 5-306 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013))).
132. Id. (quoting MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-306(a)(5)(ii) (emphasis added)).
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The existence of an
applicant against apprehended danger.’”133
apprehended danger to the applicant was an objective inquiry but could not
be established by a “vague threat” or a general fear of “liv[ing] in a
dangerous society.”134 However, failure to meet the apprehended threat
criterion did not automatically preclude an applicant from obtaining a
concealed carry permit; the Permit Unit also considered factors such as
(1) the “nearness” or likelihood of a threat or presumed threat;
(2) whether the threat can be verified; (3) whether the threat is particular
to the applicant . . . ; (4) if the threat can be presumed to exist, what is the
basis for the presumption; and (5) the length of time since the initial threat
occurred.135

New Jersey’s permit law stated that the permitting authority shall not
approve a permit application unless the applicant is “not subject to any of
the disabilities set forth in 2C:58-3c [which includes criminal history, age,
and mental health requirements], that he is thoroughly familiar with the safe
handling and use of handguns, and that he has a justifiable need to carry a
handgun.”136 Justifiable need was defined as “the urgent necessity for selfprotection, as evidenced by specific threats or previous attacks which
demonstrate a special danger to the applicant’s life that cannot be avoided
by means other than by issuance of a permit to carry a handgun.”137
California’s statutory requirement for obtaining a permit to carry a
concealed weapon stated that the issuing authority may issue a permit to an
applicant upon his showing that: “(1) The applicant is of good moral
character. (2) Good cause exists for issuance of the license. (3) The
applicant is a resident of the county or a city within the county . . . . (4) The
applicant has completed a course of training.”138
Each licensing authority (i.e., the county sheriff or municipal police
department) had to publish a written policy that provided its own definition
of “good cause.”139 San Diego County’s good cause requirement was
similar to New York’s, defining “good cause” as “[a] set of circumstances
that distinguish the applicant from the mainstream and causes him or her to
be placed in harm’s way.”140 Exceptions were made for particular classes
California courts have
of people or in particular situations.141
133. Id. (citation omitted).
134. Id. at 870 (alteration in original) (quoting Scherr v. Handgun Permit Review Bd.,
880 A.2d 1137, 1148 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005)).
135. Id.
136. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-4(c) (West 2005) (emphasis added).
137. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:54-2.4(d)(1) (Supp. 2011).
138. CAL. PENAL CODE § 26150 (West 2012) (emphasis added).
139. See Alan Gura, The Second Amendment As a Normal Right, 127 HARV. L. REV. F.
223, 223 n.3 (2014) (citing CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 26160, 26202 (West 2012)). San Diego’s
interpretation of “good cause” was found unconstitutional by the Ninth Circuit. See infra
Part III.C.1.
140. Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
141. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 25450 (West Supp. 2014) (peace officers), § 25455
(retired peace officers), § 25620 (military personnel), § 25650 (retired federal officers),
§ 26035 (on private property or place of business), § 26040 (where hunting is allowed),
§ 26045 (when faced with “immediate, grave danger” in the “brief interval before and after

2774

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

acknowledged that good cause may arise in situations related to personal
safety, as well as situations relevant for business or occupations; however,
concern for personal safety alone did not suffice.142
Illinois’s law amounted to a wholesale ban on carrying firearms in
public, similar to D.C.’s ban in Heller.143 The Illinois statute forbade a
person from carrying a firearm in any location other than his home or
business, or in the home of another when invited, unless the firearm was
“broken down in a non-functioning state; or [was] not immediately
accessible; or [was] unloaded and enclosed in a case.”144 This sweeping
requirement was found unconstitutional,145 and the Illinois legislature has
since enacted a new concealed carry law that allows people to carry
concealed weapons with a license.146 This licensing scheme does not have
a heightened permit requirement similar to the “justifiable need,” “proper
cause,” or “good and substantial reason” language found in the New Jersey,
New York, and Maryland statutes, respectively. Rather, an applicant for a
concealed carry permit must possess a Firearm Owner’s Identification
(FOID) card,147 submit to a background check, not be a convicted felon, not
have a violent misdemeanor within the past five years, and not have two or
more violations for driving while under the influence.148
D. Defining the Two-Prong Marzzarella Test
After the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Heller establishing
that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms for
self-defense, courts were faced with a flood of challenges to other firearm
regulations.149 In the wake of this chaos, the Third Circuit in United States
v. Marzzarella150 articulated a two-prong test to evaluate Second
Amendment challenges: (1) “whether the challenged law imposes a burden
on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment” and (2) if
so, whether the law survives under some form of means-end scrutiny.151 If
the local law enforcement agency . . . has been notified of the danger and before the arrival
of its assistance”), § 26050 (attempting to make a lawful arrest).
142. See Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1148.
143. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012).
144. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1(a)(4)(i)–(iii) (West Supp. 2010), invalidated by
Moore, 702 F.3d at 933.
145. See infra Part III.C.2.
146. See Firearm Concealed Carry Act, 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 66/1 (West 2014).
147. See id. 65/2, 65/8 (requiring qualifications such as U.S. citizen, over the age of
twenty-one (or eighteen, with parental consent), not mentally impaired, not addicted to
controlled substances, etc.).
148. See id. 66/30.
149. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 887 & n.30 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (noting that Heller unleashed a “tsunami of legal uncertainty, and thus litigation”
and that amicus curiae briefs estimated 190 Second Amendment challenges were brought
within the first eighteen months after Heller).
150. 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010).
151. Id. at 89 (formulating the test in the context of a federal prohibition on firearms with
obliterated serial numbers); see also Joan H. Miller, The Slow Evolution of Second
Amendment
Law,
37
SEATTLE
U.
L.
REV.
SUPRA
1,
4
(2014),
http://seattleuniversitylawreview.com/files/2014/03/MillerArticleUpdateFINAL.pdf (citing
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the challenged law is not protected by the Second Amendment (i.e., it does
not fall within the amendment’s scope), then the analysis ends and the law
is upheld.152 However, if the statute in question does implicate the Second
Amendment, then the court progresses to the second prong and “balance[s]
‘the nature of the conduct being regulated and the degree to which the
challenged law burdens the right.’”153 The Marzzarella test can be applied
to any challenge to a firearm regulation, but this Note is concerned with
state regulations that restrict an individual’s ability to carry a concealed
weapon in public.
II. THE SCOPE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT BEYOND THE HOME:
THREE INTERPRETATIONS
This part summarizes circuit courts’ differing answers to the first prong
of the Marzzarella test: whether or not the Second Amendment right
extends beyond the home. In other words, does the right to keep and bear
arms for the purpose of self-defense include the right to carry handguns
outside of the home? A circuit split has emerged over this inquiry between
(1) those that found the scope of the Second Amendment does extend
beyond the home (the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits),154 (2) those
that found the Second Amendment does not extend beyond the home (the
Tenth Circuit),155 and (3) those that explicitly chose to avoid this
constitutional question by proceeding directly to the second prong of the
analysis (the Third and Fourth Circuits).156
A. Second Amendment Extends Outside of the Home
Some legal scholars and lower courts agree that Second Amendment
protection extends beyond the home. In analyzing challenges to the various
state statutes restricting public carry, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits
affirmatively determined that Second Amendment protection does extend
beyond the home.157 The Second Circuit did not make such a definitive
statement, but instead conceded “the Amendment must have some
application in the very different context of the public possession of
courts that have applied the two-prong test: Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th
Cir. 2013); United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of
Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir.
2012); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010)).
152. See Miller, supra note 151, at 4 (citing Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., 700 F.3d at 194).
153. Id. (quoting Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., 700 F.3d at 194).
154. See Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014); Moore v. Madigan,
702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012); Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir.
2012).
155. See Peterson, 707 F.3d at 1197.
156. See Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d
426 (3d Cir. 2013).
157. See Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1155 (“[T]he right to carry in case of confrontation means
nothing if not the general right to carry a common weapon outside the home for selfdefense.”); Moore, 702 F.3d at 936 (“[O]ne doesn’t have to be a historian to realize that a
right to keep and bear arms for personal self-defense in the eighteenth century could not
rationally have been limited to the home.”).
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firearms.”158 While neither Heller nor McDonald spoke precisely to the
scope of the Second Amendment right outside of the home, the Seventh and
Ninth Circuits found that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Heller “points
in a general direction.”159
Michael O’Shea, a professor of constitutional law, believes that judicial
authority over the past two hundred years illuminates a personal right to
bear arms for self-defense which necessarily creates a right to carry a
handgun outside of one’s home.160 Judge Wilkinson of the Fourth Circuit
speculated that “[t]here may or may not be a Second Amendment right in
some places beyond the home” and the whole issue “strikes [the court] as a
vast terra incognita that courts should enter only upon necessity and only
then by small degree.”161 O’Shea, based on his extensive review of state
case law, asserts that judges who express such a concern ignore substantial
state precedent supporting the right to carry arms in public.162 Furthermore,
Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit responded to Judge Wilkinson: “Fair
enough; but that ‘vast terra incognita’ has been opened to judicial
exploration by Heller and McDonald.”163
Four features of Heller and McDonald suggest that the Second
Amendment does protect individuals’ rights to carry handguns outside of
the home: (1) the centrality of self-defense, (2) the definition of “bear
arms,” (3) the focus on handguns, and (4) the identification of
“presumptively lawful, longstanding” regulations. First, individual selfdefense is at the heart of the Second Amendment’s protection.164 In Heller,
the majority held that the military purpose implied by the prefatory clause
does not alter the “traditionally understood content of the right” (i.e., selfdefense).165 The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Moore v. Madigan166
comports with O’Shea’s interpretation that the right to bear arms outside of
the home underlies the Heller opinion because the Court emphasized selfdefense as the fundamental core of Second Amendment rights.167 The
Supreme Court recognized that “‘the need for defense of self, family, and
property is most acute’ in the home,”168 but Judge Posner extends this
concept, noting that self-defense is equally important, if not more

158. Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 89.
159. Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1150 (quoting Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 700 (7th
Cir. 2011)).
160. Michael P. O’Shea, Modeling the Second Amendment Right to Carry Arms (I):
Judicial Tradition and the Scope of “Bearing Arms” for Self-Defense, 61 AM. U. L. REV.
585, 589 (2012). O’Shea conducted an extensive review of state case law in which courts
affirm that the right to bear arms extends outside of the home. See id. at 623–64.
161. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011).
162. O’Shea, supra note 160, at 589–90.
163. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012).
164. O’Shea, supra note 160, at 609.
165. Id. at 609–10 (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008)).
166. 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012).
167. See id. at 935–37.
168. Id. at 935 (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 766–67 (2010)).
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important, outside the home.169 Confining the Second Amendment to the
home “divorce[s] the Second Amendment from the right of selfdefense.”170
Second, the Second Amendment protects an individual right to carry a
concealed firearm in public because of the definition of “bear arms.”171
The natural meaning of the phrase “bear arms” was to “wear, bear, or carry
[weapons] upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose
of . . . being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of
conflict with another person.”172 Thus, keeping a firearm in one’s home is
merely a “subset of a right” extending to citizens “who must move among
other persons in public to live.”173 The Seventh and Ninth Circuits agree
that because “‘bearing’ arms within one’s home would at all times have
been an awkward usage,” it implies a right to carry a weapon outside the
home.174 Further, Judge Hardiman in Drake v. Filko175 stated that “to
speak of ‘bearing’ arms solely within one’s home . . . would conflate
‘bearing’ with ‘keeping,’ in derogation of the Court’s holding that the verbs
codified distinct rights.”176 Judge Posner also articulated a common sense
reading of the Second Amendment: allowing a woman who obtained a
protective order against a violent ex-husband to sleep with a loaded gun
under her mattress but prohibiting her from carrying a firearm in public
“creates an arbitrary difference.”177
Third, the fact that handguns were given particular attention in Heller
implies that individuals have the right to carry these firearms in public
pursuant to the Second Amendment.178 The handgun is the “most preferred
firearm in the nation.”179 Thus, the Court’s strong protection of handgun
ownership and discussion of this firearm in particular suggests that the
“defensive role for which handguns are uniquely suited—routine carry
outside the home”—is protected under the Second Amendment.180
Fourth, Heller identifies “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings” as being
presumptively lawful regulations.181 The Ninth Circuit notes that “[w]ere
the right restricted to the home, the constitutional invincibility of such
169. Id. at 942. Heller “guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and carry weapons in
case of confrontation.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 592. And “[c]onfrontations are not limited to the
home.” Moore, 702 F.3d at 936; see also Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 444 (3d Cir. 2013)
(Hardiman, J., dissenting).
170. Moore, 702 F.3d at 937.
171. O’Shea, supra note 160, at 609.
172. Id. at 613 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 584) (alteration in original).
173. Id. (citing United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 468 (4th Cir. 2011)).
174. Moore, 702 F.3d at 936; see also Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1152
(9th Cir. 2014).
175. 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013).
176. Id. at 444 (Hardiman, J., dissenting).
177. Moore, 702 F.3d at 937.
178. See O’Shea, supra note 160, at 609.
179. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008) (quoting Parker v.
District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
180. O’Shea, supra note 160, at 615.
181. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
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restrictions would go without saying.”182 The Ninth Circuit criticized
courts, such as the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits, for failing to
explicitly recognize a Second Amendment right outside the home by
“evading an in-depth analysis of history and tradition . . . [and] miss[ing] a
crucial piece of the Second Amendment analysis.”183
In sum, the Heller and McDonald decisions gave rise to four compelling
arguments supporting the idea that the Second Amendment applies to
firearms in public places.
B. Second Amendment Does Not Extend Outside of the Home
The Tenth Circuit found that the Second Amendment is only applicable
inside the home because the country has a longstanding practice of banning
concealed carry of firearms, and the Supreme Court in Heller instructed that
nothing in its opinion should cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions.184 In
articulating this position, the court noted Heller and McDonald’s use of
nineteenth-century cases that approved of such restrictions185 and wellestablished statutory restrictions on concealed carry within the United
States.186
Some argue that the Second Amendment does not extend beyond the
home because the laws challenged and struck down by the Supreme Court
in Heller involved possession of handguns only within the home and did
not confront the question of concealed carry in public.187 Further, the
182. Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1153 (9th Cir. 2014).
183. Id. at 1174–75 (discussing Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 2013);
Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 875–76 (4th Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. Cnty. of
Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 2012)). Interestingly, the dissent in Moore critiqued
the Seventh Circuit majority, which also refrained from engaging with history and tradition
when considering whether the Second Amendment includes a right beyond the home. See
Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 943 (7th Cir. 2012) (Williams, J., dissenting). Judge
Williams stated that the court should have repeated the methodology and analysis applied in
Heller to address the question of firearm possession in public as opposed to the home. Id. at
943. The majority believed that the state, in asserting that the Second Amendment right to
self-defense does not extend to the public, was asking the court to “repudiate Heller’s
historical analysis.” See id. However, the dissent points out that Heller did not consider
whether a preexisting right to carry firearms in public for self-defense existed, and by asking
the court to make this assessment, the state was in fact “embrac[ing] Heller’s method of
analysis” by requesting that the court embark on the same analysis but for the different right
being asserted. Id.
184. See Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1210 (10th Cir. 2013). Some historical
sources indicate that only open carry, not concealed carry, is protected by the Second
Amendment. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. In Peterson, a Washington state
resident applied for a concealed handgun license in Colorado; however, Colorado law states
that such licenses may only be issued to state residents. See Peterson, 707 F.3d at 1201.
After being denied the license, the Washington resident brought suit alleging that the
Colorado statute violated the Second Amendment. See id.
185. See Peterson, 707 F.3d at 1210–11 (citing Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281–
82 (1897); State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 490 (1850); Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251
(1846)).
186. See id. at 1211. For discussion of the history of concealed carry laws, see supra
notes 78–110 and accompanying text.
187. See O’Shea, supra note 160, at 589 (citing People v. Aguilar, 944 N.E.2d 816, 827
(Ill. App. Ct. 2011); Williams v. State, 10 A.3d 1167, 1177 (Md. 2011)). But see Drake, 724
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history of the Founding era indicates that there was no right to travel with a
weapon in public under English law.188 As such, Heller and McDonald
cannot be invoked to support a finding that the Second Amendment protects
public carrying of handguns.189
C. Silence on Whether the Second Amendment Extends Beyond the Home
Some lower courts chose to avoid deciding the constitutional issue under
the first prong of the Marzzarella test and instead proceeded directly to the
second prong of the analysis.190 These court opinions found that even
assuming the Second Amendment right extends outside of the home, the
regulation, for example, a justifiable-need standard for issuing permits,
survives the second prong inquiry.191 Justifiable-need standards have
“survived intermediate scrutiny even when the court has punted on the
question of whether the concealed carry of firearms in public places is
conduct protected by the Second Amendment.”192 The Fourth Circuit took
this approach in Woollard v. Gallagher.193 It noted that other courts have
“deemed it prudent to instead resolve post-Heller challenges to firearm
prohibitions at the second step.”194 As such, the Fourth Circuit refrained
F.3d at 445 (Hardiman, J., dissenting) (“Describing the holding [as encompassing a general
right to self-defense]—first establishing the legal principle embodied in the Second
Amendment and then explaining how it was applied—demonstrates that the legal principle
enunciated in Heller is not confined to the facts presented in that case.”).
188. See Saul A. Cornell & Nathan Kozuskanich, Appendix A: The Scholarly Landscape
Since Heller, in THE SECOND AMENDMENT ON TRIAL, supra note 18, at 393.
189. See O’Shea, supra note 160, at 589.
190. See, e.g., Drake, 724 F.3d at 430 (“It remains unsettled whether the individual right
to bear arms for the purpose of self-defense extends beyond the home.”); United States v.
Mahin, 668 F.3d 119 (4th Cir. 2012); Hightower v. City of Boston, 693 F.3d 61, 72 (1st Cir.
2012); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011) (expressing belief
that this issue is a “vast terra incognita” that courts should enter only upon necessity). For
analysis of the second prong of the Marzzarella test, see Part III.B–C.
191. See Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e merely assume
that the Heller right exists outside the home and that such right of . . . Woollard has been
infringed. We are free to make that assumption because the good-and-substantial-reason
requirement passes constitutional muster under . . . intermediate scrutiny.”).
192. Miller, supra note 151, at 5–6 (citing Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876).
193. 712 F.3d at 876; see also William Young, Jr., Woollard v. Gallagher: Normalizing
the Fourth Circuit’s Approach to Second Amendment Challenges, 73 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES
35, 64 (2014), available at http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1029&context=endnotes (endorsing the Fourth Circuit’s judicial restraint when
using, in Young’s opinion, the appropriate “measure of deference to legislative judgments”).
194. Woollard, 712 F.3d at 875; see also Mahin, 668 F.3d at 123 (refraining from
recognizing Second Amendment protections outside of the home because the court could
assume that Mahin “engaged in activity which implicates the Second Amendment” and still
“uphold [his] conviction”); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 204 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Although we are inclined to
uphold the challenged federal laws at step one of our analytical framework, in an abundance
of caution, we proceed to step two.”); Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89
(2d Cir. 2012) (“Although the Supreme Court’s cases applying the Second Amendment have
arisen only in connection with prohibitions on the possession of firearms in the home, the
Court’s analysis suggests . . . that the Amendment must have some application in the very
different context of the public possession of firearms. Our analysis proceeds on this
assumption.”).
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from determining whether Maryland’s heightened requirement for obtaining
a handgun permit implicated Second Amendment rights.195 Instead, the
court was entitled to merely assume that the right identified in Heller
existed outside of the home because the good-and-substantial reason
requirement passed constitutional muster under intermediate scrutiny.196
The Second Circuit also determined that the “proper cause requirement falls
outside the core Second Amendment protections identified in Heller”
because the “state’s ability to regulate firearms and . . . conduct, is
qualitatively different in public than in the home.”197
The Third Circuit upheld New Jersey’s restrictive “justifiable need”
requirement for obtaining a concealed carry permit.198 The court found that
this requirement fell outside the scope of the Second Amendment because it
is a “presumptively lawful” and “longstanding” restriction on firearm
possession.199 In its analysis through the two-prong test, the court
“decline[d] to definitively declare that the individual right to bear arms for
the purpose of self-defense extend[ed] beyond the home, the ‘core’ of the
right as identified by Heller.”200
In brief, the above circuit courts disagreed on the first prong of the
Marzzarella test, namely whether the Second Amendment right extends to
carrying handguns in public. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits endorsed the
constitutional right to keep and bear arms outside of the home, whereas the
Tenth Circuit did not. The Third and Fourth Circuits avoided the question
entirely, while the Second Circuit merely assumed that the right exists in
public. With the exception of the Tenth Circuit, all circuit courts proceeded
to prong two of the Marzzarella test to determine the constitutionality of the
statutes.
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS
ON CONCEALED CARRY
This part begins by identifying the appropriate standard of review for
challenges to states’ statutory restrictions on concealed carry. Identifying
this standard of review is a prerequisite for the analysis under the second
prong of the Marzzarella test: whether a given law survives under the
predetermined level of scrutiny. It then summarizes a circuit split that has
developed in the wake of Heller over whether concealed carry laws survive
under the appropriate level of scrutiny or impermissibly infringe on a
citizen’s Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. The Second,
Third, and Fourth Circuits have found that laws requiring applicants to
195. See Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876; supra notes 131–32 and accompanying text
(discussing Maryland’s heightened statutory requirement for obtaining a concealed carry
permit).
196. See Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876; infra Part III.B.2.
197. Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 94.
198. See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 429 (3d Cir. 2013).
199. Id. at 433 (“The ‘justifiable need’ standard fits comfortably within the longstanding
tradition of regulating the public carrying of weapons for self-defense.”).
200. Id. at 431.
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demonstrate a heightened need for a firearm are constitutional under the
Second Amendment.201 On the other hand, the Seventh and the Ninth
Circuits held that state laws limiting an individual’s ability to carry a
concealed firearm in public, either through heightened permit requirements
or through what amounts to a flat-out ban, are not constitutional.202
A. The Appropriate Standard of Review
Means-end scrutiny examines the methods (means) chosen to further the
purposes (ends) that the regulation is designed to serve.203 This method of
scrutiny evaluates the sufficiency of a governmental body’s justification for
its law.204 Three levels of means-end scrutiny are available to courts when
evaluating a regulation that infringes on the Second Amendment: rational
basis review, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.205 The level of
scrutiny applied in a given case is dependent upon “the regulation’s burden
on the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.”206 The more
fundamental a right is, the higher level of scrutiny must be applied, but “as
we move outside the home, firearm rights have always been more limited,
because public safety interests often outweigh individual interests in selfdefense,” and a lower level of scrutiny is permissible.207 The Supreme
Court in Heller instructed that an individual’s right to bear a firearm within
his home for the purpose of self-defense is fundamental,208 and any
restriction thus would be subject to a high level of scrutiny.209 However, an
individual’s right to carry firearms in public, even if one finds that the
Second Amendment does extend beyond the home, is more limited and

201. See id.; Woollard, 712 F.3d at 865; Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 81.
202. See Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014); Moore v. Madigan,
702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012).
203. See Russell W. Galloway, Means-End Scrutiny in American Constitutional Law, 21
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 449, 449 (1988).
204. See id. (“If a sufficient justification exists, the action may be permitted despite the
applicability of the limit. If the courts find the justification insufficient, . . . the limit . . . is
unconstitutional.”).
205. See Drake, 724 F.3d at 435 (citing United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 95–99
(3d Cir. 2010)); see also id. at 451–61.
206. Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1167 (quoting Nordyke v. King, 681 F.3d 1041, 1045–46 (9th
Cir. 2012)); see also Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1257 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (requiring a “strong justification” for regulations imposing a “substantial burden
upon the core right of self-defense”); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 706, 708 (7th
Cir. 2011) (applying more demanding scrutiny to “severe burdens on the core Second
Amendment right”); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 469–70 (4th Cir. 2011)
(requiring “strong justification[s]” for “severe burden[s] on the core Second Amendment
right” (quoting United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682–83 (4th Cir. 2010)));
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97 (calibrating the level of scrutiny to the “severity” of the burden
imposed).
207. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 470; accord Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d
81, 96 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Because our tradition so clearly indicates a substantial role for state
regulation of the carrying of firearms in public, we conclude that intermediate scrutiny is
appropriate in this case.”).
208. See Heller v. District of Columbia, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008).
209. See Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 470.
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would be subjected to a lower level of scrutiny because the state has a
legitimate interest to promote public safety.210
Under the least intense standard of review, rational basis review, a court
presumes the challenged law is valid and determines “only whether the
statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”211 While Heller
expressly avoided determining the appropriate standard of review,212 Heller
did condemn the use of rational basis review for challenges to firearm
regulations.213
The most rigorous standard of review, strict scrutiny, demands that the
regulation be “narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government
interest.”214 Under this standard, the government must choose the least
restrictive means for achieving the state’s purpose.215 Strict scrutiny may
be triggered if a regulation threatens a right at the core of the Second
Amendment: for example, the right of a law-abiding citizen to keep and use
a handgun in his home.216 In regards to concealed carry, however, courts
agree that “[i]f the Second Amendment protects the right to carry a handgun
outside the home for self-defense at all, that right is not part of the core of
the Amendment.”217 The distinction between self-defense inside versus
outside the home calls for use of a standard less rigorous than strict scrutiny
when evaluating firearm regulations limiting use outside of the home.218
As such, strict scrutiny is also an inappropriate standard of review for
evaluating challenges to concealed carry regulations.
In between these two standards of scrutiny lies intermediate scrutiny,
under which the state’s interest must be “more than just legitimate but need

210. Id.
211. Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 435 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at
95–96 n.13).
212. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 (refraining from determining appropriate level of
scrutiny because the D.C. handgun ban was unconstitutional “[u]nder any of the standards of
scrutiny . . . applied to enumerated constitutional rights”).
213. See id. at 629 n.27.
214. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
215. See id. Identifying the least restrictive means, however, is challenging because
individuals staunchly disagree over whether increased gun control reduces danger to society.
See Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An
Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1465–66 (2009).
Gun control proponents argue that banning guns is the only effective way to prevent crime,
while gun control opponents argue that firearm restrictions will not prevent crimes because
those who misuse guns are the individuals who do not comply with the law. See id. at 1465.
Volokh points out the empirical black hole that surrounds firearm-related statistics by citing
methodological critiques of many studies that purport to demonstrate a relationship between
gun control and crime statistics. See id. at 1466. He further notes that “because of this
uncertainty,” lower courts’ analyses of gun regulations often turn on how they “evaluate
empirical claims of likely danger reduction.” Id. at 1467.
216. See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms &
Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012).
217. Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 436 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Piszczatoski v. Filko, 840
F. Supp. 2d 813, 834 (D.N.J. 2012)).
218. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Kachalsky v. Cnty.
of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 96 (2d Cir. 2012)).
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not be compelling.”219 Under this standard, the government must put forth
a “significant, substantial, or important interest,” which has a “reasonable
fit” to the “challenged law, such that the law does not burden more conduct
than is reasonably necessary.”220 Such fit must merely be “substantial, ‘not
perfect.’”221 The state bears the burden of proof; its “justification must be
genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation.”222
However, the state may rely on “a wide range of sources, such as legislative
text and history, empirical evidence, case law, and common sense” to
satisfy its burden.223 In cases where firearm regulations burden an
individual’s right to keep and bear arms in public rather than in the home,
intermediate scrutiny applies.224
Other courts have rejected this framework and instead employed the
reasonableness test225 or an undue burden test.226 Professor Eugene Volokh
suggests that courts, rather than employing one of the previously
constructed tests, should instead consider four categories of justifications
for restricting rights: (1) scope, (2) burden, (3) danger reduction, and
(4) government as proprietor, and use these to determine the proper scope
of government authority.227 A group of judges led by Judge Kavanaugh of
the D.C. Circuit, the dissenting judge in Heller’s appellate court opinion,
rejected balancing tests and instead relied on the “common use test”
outlined in Heller.228

219. Drake, 724 F.3d at 436.
220. Id. (citing United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 98 (3d Cir. 2010)).
Intermediate scrutiny is subject to the same weaknesses as strict scrutiny in that empirical
data necessary to establish a reasonable fit between the challenged law and the government
interest is severely lacking. See supra note 215.
221. Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 97 (quoting Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97).
222. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
223. United States v. Carter, 669 F.3d 411, 418 (4th Cir. 2012).
224. See Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 93 n.17 (citing cases that all applied intermediate
scrutiny: Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1261–64 (D.C. Cir. 2011); United States v. Booker, 644
F.3d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470 (4th Cir. 2011);
United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010); Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97;
United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 802 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Skoien, 614
F.3d 638, 641–41 (7th Cir. 2010)); see also Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012); GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc.
v. Georgia, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1317 (M.D. Ga. 2011) (noting it joins the “majority of
other courts” in concluding that “intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard of
scrutiny”); Miller, supra note 151, at 4 n.19.
225. See Tina Mehr & Adam Winkler, The Standardless Second Amendment, AM.
CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW & POLICY 6–7 (Oct. 2010), http://www.acslaw.org/
files/Mehr%20and%20Winkler%20Standardless%20Second%20Amendment.pdf.
226. See Kiehl, supra note 104, at 1148 (citing Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 460 (9th
Cir. 2009); People v. Flores, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 804, 809 n.5 (Ct. App. 2008)).
227. Volokh, supra note 215, at 1446–47.
228. The common use test establishes the class of weapons protected by the Second
Amendment; weapons commonly used include handguns, shotguns, and rifles, while
“dangerous and unusual weapons” such as fully automatic machine guns do not receive
constitutional protection. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008). See,
e.g., Gowder v. City of Chicago, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1118–19 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (employing
an analysis of the text, history, and tradition of the challenged statute and the Second
Amendment).
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Of the five circuits discussed in Part III of this Note, the Second, Third,
and Fourth Circuits chose to adopt the intermediate standard of scrutiny.229
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits did not explicitly reject intermediate
scrutiny, but they chose not to apply any particular standard of heightened
scrutiny.230 The Seventh Circuit decided that degrees of scrutiny were
irrelevant because the state simply failed to justify “the most restrictive gun
law of any of the 50 states.”231 The Ninth Circuit wanted to “parallel[] the
analysis in Heller itself” in which the Court chose not to apply a particular
level of scrutiny.232
B. Statutory Restrictions on Concealed Carry Are Constitutional
Of the five circuit courts that considered the constitutionality of
restrictions on a citizen’s ability to obtain a concealed carry permit, the
Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits found such restrictions constitutional.
The state legislatures in each state used different language to implement a
heightened requirement;233 however, the Second and Fourth Circuits’
opinions mirrored each other while the Third Circuit’s decision followed
different reasoning.
1. Second Circuit: Upholding a Showing of “Proper Cause”
In Kachalsky v. County of Westchester,234 the Second Circuit held that
New York legislation restricting full-carry concealed-handgun licenses to
applicants demonstrating “proper cause” was constitutional.235 The Second
Circuit established that the proper cause requirement was substantially
related to important governmental interests in public safety and crime
prevention.236 The court noted that its “role is only to ‘assure that, in
formulating its judgments, [New York] has drawn reasonable inferences
based on substantial evidence.’”237
The Second Circuit provided a mere four-sentence explanation of
whether there was a reasonable fit between New York’s statute and the
government interest.238 The court determined that restricting possession in
229. See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 430 (3d Cir. 2013); Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 96;
Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013).
230. See Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1175 (9th Cir. 2014); Moore v.
Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 2012).
231. Moore, 702 F.3d at 941.
232. Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1175.
233. See supra Part I.C for description of relevant state laws.
234. 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012).
235. Id. at 101 (finding N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(2)(f) (McKinney 2008) constitutional:
“A license for a pistol or revolver, other than an assault weapon or a disguised gun, shall be
issued to . . . (f) have and carry concealed, without regard to employment or place of
possession, by any person when proper cause exists for the issuance thereof”). See supra
notes 124–30 and accompanying text for summary of the New York statute.
236. See Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 97.
237. Id. (alteration in original) (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665
(1994)).
238. See David T. Hardy, The Right to Arms and Standards of Review: A Tale of Three
Circuits, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1435, 1449 n.89 (2014) (citing Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 98–99).
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this manner “is substantially related to New York’s interests in public safety
and crime prevention.”239 Contrary to the plaintiff’s assertion, the court
held that this regulation was not an “arbitrary licensing regime no different
from limiting handgun possession to every tenth citizen.”240
The Second Circuit cited New York’s longstanding tradition of
restricting handgun use to endorse the legislature’s decision to limit firearm
possession to only those showing proper cause.241 Specifically, “New
York’s legislative judgment” regarding limiting firearms in public was born
over one hundred years ago, with the enactment of the Sullivan Law
identifying “dangers inherent in the carrying of handguns in public.”242 In
1913, the legislature determined that a legitimate method for guarding
against these dangers was to restrict handgun possession to only individuals
showing proper cause, a regulation that still stands today.243
The court recognized inconsistent results of studies put forth by the
opposing parties, some showing that increased handgun ownership by
lawful citizens does not increase crime and others showing that “widespread
access to handguns in public increases the likelihood that felonies will
result in death and fundamentally alters the safety and character of public
spaces.”244 Notwithstanding this conflicting evidence, the court ultimately
deferred to the legislature’s judgments because “[i]t is the legislature’s job,
not [the court’s], to weigh conflicting evidence and make policy
judgments.”245
2. Fourth Circuit: Permitting Proof of a “Good and Substantial Reason”
In Woollard v. Gallagher, the Fourth Circuit held that Maryland
legislation restricting concealed carry permits to applicants demonstrating a
“good and substantial reason” was constitutional.246 The court split its
analysis into two primary inquiries. First, “whether the governmental
interest asserted by the state constitutes a ‘substantial’ one.”247 Second,
“whether the good-and-substantial-reason requirement . . . is ‘reasonably
adapted’ to Maryland’s significant interests.”248 In other words, has the

239. Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 98.
240. Id.
241. See id. at 84–85, 97.
242. Id. at 97 (citing Sullivan Law, ch. 195, 1911 N.Y. Laws 442). However, New York
began regulating general firearm usage as far back as 1785. See id. at 84 (citing Law of Apr.
22, 1785, ch. 81, 1785 N.Y. Laws 152; Law of Apr. 13, 1784, ch. 28, 1784 N.Y. Laws 627).
243. Id. at 97 (citing Sullivan Law, ch. 608, 1913 N.Y. Laws 1627–30).
244. Id. at 99.
245. Id.
246. See Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 882 (4th Cir. 2013). See supra notes 131–
35 and accompanying text for summary of the Maryland statute. The applicant must
establish a “good and substantial reason to wear, carry, or transport a handgun, such as a
finding that the permit is necessary as a reasonable precaution against apprehended danger.”
Woollard, 712 F.3d at 869 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-306(a)(5)(ii)
(LexisNexis 2011) (emphasis added)).
247. Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876.
248. Id. at 878 (citing United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010)).
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state demonstrated a “reasonable fit” between the heightened permit
requirement and the government interest of protecting public safety?249
The court first tackled whether the governmental interest constituted a
substantial one.250 Maryland’s legislature explained that the permitting
requirements were meant to serve the state’s interest in “protecting public
safety and preventing crime.”251 When enacting the good-and-substantialreason requirement, the legislature codified its findings that:
(1) the number of violent crimes committed in the State has increased
alarmingly in recent years; (2) a high percentage of violent crimes
committed in the State involves the use of handguns; (3) the result is a
substantial increase in the number of deaths and injuries largely traceable
to the carrying of handguns in public places by criminals; (4) current law
has not been effective in curbing the more frequent use of handguns in
committing crime; and (5) additional regulations on the wearing, carrying,
and transporting of handguns are necessary to preserve the peace and
tranquility of the State and to protect the rights and liberties of the
public.252

This includes the finding that in 2009, Maryland had the “eighth highest
violent crime rate, the third highest homicide rate, and the second highest
robbery rate of any state.”253 In that same year, 97.4 percent of all
homicides involving firearms were committed with handguns, and 83.5
percent of law enforcement officers who died in the line of duty died as a
result of “intentional gunfire, usually from a handgun.”254 Given these
findings, the court noted that it could understand the state’s “impetus to
enact measures aimed at protecting public safety and preventing crime” and
that such goals constitute a “substantial governmental interest.”255
Next, the court found that the good-and-substantial-reason requirement
was substantially related to these government interests. The requirement
ensures “access to handgun permits for those who need them while
preventing a greater-than-necessary proliferation of handguns in public
places.”256 The good-and-substantial-reason requirement reduces the
prevalence of handguns in public,257 but it still allows “persons in palpable

249. Id. (citing Chester, 628 F.3d at 683). See supra notes 219–24 and accompanying
text for an overview of intermediate scrutiny.
250. See Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876.
251. Id.
252. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-202 (LexisNexis 2002).
253. Woollard, 712 F.3d at 877 (quotations omitted).
254. Id.
255. Id.; see also Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 376 (1997)
(referring to the “significant governmental interest in public safety”); United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987) (characterizing “the Government’s general interest in
preventing crime” as “compelling”); United States v. Chapman, 666 F.3d 220, 227 (4th Cir.
2012) (relying on Schenck and Salerno in holding that “reducing domestic gun violence is a
substantial governmental objective”).
256. Woollard, 712 F.3d at 880.
257. Id. at 879.
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need of self-protection [to] arm themselves in public places where
Maryland’s various permit exceptions do not apply.”258
In view of the legislature’s deliberations related to the concealed carry
statute, the court elected to defer to the legislature.259 Relying on a
combination of legislative findings, testimony, and legislative deference,
the Fourth Circuit concluded that Maryland’s statute survived intermediate
scrutiny.260 Although the court assumed the heightened requirement
burdened the plaintiff’s Second Amendment right, such burden was
constitutionally permissible; under intermediate scrutiny, the state had
sufficiently demonstrated that the good-and-substantial-reason requirement
was “reasonably adapted” to the state’s interest in public safety and
preventing crime.261
3. Third Circuit: Sustaining a “Justifiable Need” Requirement
In Drake v. Filko, the Third Circuit found that New Jersey legislation
restricting concealed carry permits to applicants demonstrating a “justifiable
need” was constitutional.262 The Third Circuit’s conclusion differed from
both the Second and Fourth Circuit’s conclusions discussed above in that
the court found that New Jersey’s permitting requirement “qualifies as a
presumptively lawful, longstanding regulation,”263 which Heller identified
as a separate category of handgun restrictions.264 This decision was
reached without proceeding through the two-prong test; however, given the
“important constitutional issues presented,” the court still decided to
evaluate whether the justifiable need standard survived the intermediate
level of scrutiny.265 Ultimately, the court found that even if the heightened
requirement did not qualify as a presumptively lawful, longstanding
regulation, the justifiable need standard would still pass intermediate
scrutiny and stand as constitutional.266
The court’s dual analysis began by determining that the state’s
heightened requirement qualifies as a presumptively lawful regulation. The
Third Circuit had previously established that certain “longstanding
regulations are ‘exceptions’ to the right to keep and bear arms, such that the
conduct they regulate is not within the scope of the Second

258. Id. at 880. Maryland’s permit exceptions allowed individuals to wear, carry, or
transport handguns in his own home or personal business property, as well as some public
locations. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-203(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011).
259. Woollard, 712 F.3d at 881 (quoting Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81,
99 (2d Cir. 2012)).
260. See Young, supra note 193, at 62.
261. Woollard, 712 F.3d at 882.
262. Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 440 (3d Cir. 2013). See supra notes 136–37 and
accompanying text for a summary of the New Jersey statute.
263. Drake, 724 F.3d at 429 (citations and quotations omitted).
264. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
265. Drake, 724 F.3d at 430.
266. See id.
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Amendment.”267 Heller noted that its opinion should not be taken “to cast
doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons
and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive
places such as schools and government buildings,” and that these identified
regulations are not an exhaustive list.268 The Court did not, however,
provide guidance on how to determine what qualifies as a presumptively
lawful regulation.269
The court previously had warned “prudence counsels caution when
extending [the] recognized [Heller] exceptions to novel regulations
unmentioned in Heller.”270 However, the court in Drake nevertheless
determined that New Jersey’s justifiable need requirement qualifies as a
presumptively lawful, longstanding regulation under Heller.271 The court
looked to the historical roots of the justifiable need standard to qualify it as
presumptively lawful, as the standard had existed in some form for nearly
ninety years.272 Since 1924, New Jersey “directed that no persons (other
than those specifically exempted such as police officers and the like) shall
carry [concealed] handguns except pursuant to permits issuable only on a
showing of need.”273 Although the permit law underwent multiple
revisions, the requirement of demonstrating “need” was present in every
version; the present-day “justifiable-need” standard “became statutorily
enshrined” in 1978.274 This heightened need requirement “fits comfortably
within the longstanding tradition of regulating the public carrying of
weapons for self-defense.”275
While all the exceptions named in Heller “derived from historical
regulations,” the court found that such “pre-ratification presence” is not a
prerequisite for a statute to qualify as a categorical exception to the Second
Amendment.276 The court drew an analogy between New Jersey and New
York’s concealed carry statute.277 In New York, the statute was “adopted
in the same era that states began adopting the felon in possession statutes
that Heller explicitly recognized as being presumptively lawful
longstanding regulations.”278 In fact, the Supreme Court “considered
267. Id. at 431 (citing United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 600 (3d Cir. 2012); United
States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 2011)); see also United States v. Marzzarella,
614 F.3d 85, 91 (3d Cir. 2010).
268. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 & n.26 (2008).
269. See Drake, 724 F.3d at 432.
270. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 93.
271. See Drake, 724 F.3d at 432.
272. See id. (citing Siccardi v. State, 284 A.2d 533, 538 (N.J. 1971)).
273. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Siccardi, 284 A.2d at 538).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 433 (noting that the New Jersey standard is in fact less restrictive than
historical limitations).
276. Id. at 432 (quoting United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 2010))
(preempting criticism that all “presumptively lawful” regulations found in Heller had a
longstanding historical presence, and thus in order for a restriction to fall within this
category, it must have been present prior to ratification of the Constitution).
277. See id. at 433.
278. Id. (quoting Piszczatoski v. Filko, 840 F. Supp. 2d 813, 830–31 (D.N.J. 2012)). The
court is inferring that because the New Jersey statute has been established equally as long as
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prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons to be longstanding
although states did not start to enact them until the early 20th century.”279
For a statute to be considered presumptively lawful, the court concluded
that a regulation requiring a “particularized showing of objective
justification to carry a handgun” need not have existed at the time of the
adoption of the Bill of Rights.280
The dissent fervently disagreed with the majority’s determination that the
justifiable need requirement qualifies as a presumptively lawful
regulation.281 Judge Hardiman noted that the court’s hesitancy in
recognizing such longstanding regulations was legitimate, as it creates a
bold precedent in which the judiciary is determining that a “certain
regulation is completely outside the reach of the Second Amendment, not
merely that the regulation is a permissible burden on the Second
Amendment right.”282 Equally dangerous, the majority conducted its
“longstandingness analysis” at “too high a level of generality.”283 The
majority chose laws that generally have regulated the public carry of
firearms as its reference point, when the court should have considered
whether a longstanding tradition exists of “condition[ing] the issuance of
permits on a showing of a greater need for self-defense.”284
In response to the majority’s defense that pre-ratification presence is not
a prerequisite to categorizing a regulation as presumptively lawful, the
dissent noted “[a]lthough ‘a regulation can be deemed ‘longstanding’ even
if it cannot boast a precise founding-era analogue,’ Heller requires, at a
minimum, that a regulation be rooted in history.”285 The dissent further
noted that regulations without a “clear historical pedigree” have not been
found by courts to fit within this “longstandingness” exception.286 If such
regulations are upheld as constitutional, it is because the statute survived

the New York statute, and the New York statute was created around the same time as other
laws Heller recognized as presumptively lawful, then New Jersey’s statute has been
established long enough such that pre-ratification presence should not preclude its status as a
longstanding regulation.
279. Id. at 433–34 (quoting Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quotations
omitted).
280. Id. at 434.
281. See id. at 447–51 (Hardiman, J., dissenting).
282. Id. at 447.
283. Id. at 451.
284. Id. (emphasis added).
285. Id. at 450 (quoting Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 196 (5th Cir. 2012)).
286. Id. at 447 (citing Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (declining to
recognize as longstanding a multitude of District of Columbia handgun registration
requirements, including laws requiring re-registration after three years and requiring
applicants to demonstrate knowledge about firearms, be fingerprinted and photographed,
take firearms training or safety courses, meet a vision requirement, and submit to a
background check); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 681 (4th Cir. 2010) (declining to
recognize as longstanding a law prohibiting firearm possession by domestic violence
misdemeanants because historical data were inconclusive)).
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constitutional scrutiny, not because it was categorized as presumptively
lawful.287
The majority did, however, continue its analysis in the event the
heightened requirement was not in fact presumptively lawful.288 The State
of New Jersey “undoubtedly” has a “significant, substantial and important
interest” in ensuring public safety.289 Therefore, the court framed its
inquiry as “whether there is a ‘reasonable fit’ between this interest in safety
and the means chosen by New Jersey to achieve it: the Handgun Permit
Law and its ‘justifiable need’ standard.”290 The court conceded that the
state failed to present the court with evidence to show why or how the
legislators arrived at their judgment.291 However, the court stated that
“New Jersey’s inability to muster legislative history indicating what reports,
statistical information, and other studies its legislature pondered . . . is
unsurprising.”292 When New Jersey enacted its concealed carry statute,
Heller had not yet found that the Second Amendment protected an
individual right to bear arms, so the legislature “could not have foreseen
that restrictions on carrying a firearm outside the home could run afoul” of
this amendment.293 The court “refuse[d] to hold that the fit here is not
reasonable” simply because the state was unable to present data or statistics
upon which it based its decision.294 Rather than relying on evidence, the
legislature made “reasonable inference[s]” in light of the lethal nature of
handguns and felt that requiring an applicant to demonstrate a
“particularized need for a permit” legitimately serves the state’s interest.295
The legislature made no attempt to defend the statute, but instead “made a
policy judgment” that the justifiable need requirement burdened Second
Amendment rights no more than was “reasonably necessary” to ensure
public safety.296 The Third Circuit in effect “excuse[d] the state from
putting forth evidence to support the legislature’s judgment” and afforded
the New Jersey legislature substantial deference.297
The dissent again disparaged both the substance and form of the
majority’s analysis.298 First, the state bears the burden of “justifying its
restrictions” and therefore must “affirmatively establish the reasonable fit
[the court] require[s].”299 The court should only consider the reason offered
by the state, which was merely that “the justifiable need requirement is
287. See id. at 447 (Hardiman, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Marzzarella, 614
F.3d 85, 95–101 (3d Cir. 2010)).
288. See id. at 437–40 (majority opinion).
289. Id. at 437 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).
290. Id.
291. See id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 437–38.
294. Id. at 438.
295. Id. (quoting Piszczatoski v. Filko, 840 F. Supp. 2d 813, 835 (D.N.J. 2012)).
296. Id. at 439.
297. Young, supra note 193, at 62 (citing Drake, 724 F.3d at 436–69) (noting that the
court essentially relied on “common sense, legislative history, and reasonable inferences”).
298. See Drake, 724 F.3d at 453–54 (Hardiman, J., dissenting).
299. Id. at 453 (quoting Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
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designed to combat the dangers and risks associated with the misuse and
accidental use of handguns.”300 New Jersey presented no support for “how
or why its interest in preventing [abuse] of handguns is furthered by
limiting possession to those who can show a greater need for self-defense
than the typical citizen.”301 Unable to present “any study, empirical data, or
legislative findings,” the state argued that “the fit [i]s a matter of common
sense.”302 The majority in effect had applied rational basis review, a
standard rejected by the Court in Heller, under the guise of intermediate
scrutiny.303 Put bluntly, “The majority err[ed] in absolving New Jersey of
its obligation to show fit,” because it is the court’s duty “to evaluate the
State’s proffered evidence, not to accept reflexively its litigation
position.”304
Ultimately, the majority held that the heightened justifiable need
requirement to carry a handgun for self-defense qualified as a
presumptively lawful, longstanding regulation and as such did not burden
conduct protected by the Second Amendment.305 Further, even if this
regulation failed to qualify as presumptively lawful, it passed intermediate
scrutiny and was constitutional.306 While the Third Circuit here reached the
same conclusion as the Second and Fourth Circuits discussed above, it did
so through a very different analysis and relied on nearly no evidence put
forth by the State.307 Thus, the dissent convincingly attacked both modes of
the majority’s analysis, leaving the decision on weak footing for subsequent
challenges.
C. Statutory Restrictions on Concealed Carry Are Unconstitutional
The Ninth and Seventh Circuits, the two remaining courts to have
considered the constitutionality of restrictions on carrying a concealed
firearm, both found the respective county or state requirements
unconstitutional.

300. Id. (citation omitted).
301. Id.
302. Id. at 454 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Carter, 669 F.3d 411, 419
(4th Cir. 2012)).
303. Alex Poor, Bearing the Burden of Denial: Observations of Lower Court Decisions
Misapplying Supreme Court Precedent in Second Amendment Cases, 67 SMU L. REV. 401,
423–24 (2014).
304. Drake, 724 F.3d at 454 (citing Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(holding that the government had not borne its burden under intermediate scrutiny because
“the District needs to present some meaningful evidence, not mere assertions, to justify its
predictive judgments”); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the government had not borne its burden under intermediate scrutiny because “the
government has offered numerous plausible reasons why the disarmament of domestic
violence misdemeanants is substantially related to an important government goal; however,
it has not attempted to offer sufficient evidence to establish a substantial relationship
between [18 U.S.C.] § 922(g)(9) and an important governmental goal”)).
305. Id. at 439–40 (majority opinion).
306. Id.
307. See supra notes 271, 291 and accompanying text.
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1. Ninth Circuit: Striking Down a “Good Cause” Requirement
In Peruta v. County of San Diego, San Diego’s “good cause” requirement
for obtaining a concealed carry permit was struck down by the Ninth
Circuit as unconstitutional.308 Open carry is completely prohibited in San
Diego County,309 and it is against this generally restrictive regime that the
“unconstitutionality of the County’s restrictive interpretation of ‘good
cause’ becomes apparent.”310 Although the Second Amendment does not
require states to allow concealed carry, it does “require that the states
permit some form of carry for self-defense outside the home.”311
Historically, social convention has dictated which form of carry a state
allows.312 California’s preference for concealed carry as opposed to open
carry is constitutional, “so long as it allows one of the two.”313
Although the county’s regulation did not deny all individuals the right to
bear arms in public,314 the court noted its inquiry does not end merely
because a small group of individuals may exercise this right.315 Thus, the
court determined not whether San Diego’s interpretation of the state’s good
cause requirement “allow[ed] some people to bear arms outside the home in
some places at some times” but whether the “typical responsible, lawabiding citizen” was able to carry a firearm in public for self-defense.316 In
San Diego, good cause was defined as “[a] set of circumstances that
distinguish the applicant from the mainstream and causes him or her to be
placed in harm’s way.”317 The court found that in San Diego, a “typical”
law-abiding citizen “fearing for his personal safety—by definition—cannot

308. See supra notes 138–42 and accompanying text for summary of the California
statute. A license may be issued if: “(1) The applicant is of good moral character. (2) Good
cause exists for issuance of the license. (3) The applicant is a resident of the county or a city
within the county . . . . (4) The applicant has completed a course of training . . . .” CAL.
PENAL CODE § 26150 (West 2012) (emphasis added).
309. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 25850, 26350.
310. Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1171 (9th Cir. 2014). The dissent
believes the majority misidentifies the conduct at issue because the majority puts too much
weight on the fact that California prohibits open carry of firearms in public (making the right
to carry concealed firearms that much more imperative). It frames the issue as “whether a
responsible, law-abiding citizen has a right under the Second Amendment to carry a firearm
in public for self-defense,” while the dissent asserts that the conduct at issue is more narrow–
carrying a concealed firearm in public, notwithstanding prohibitions on open carry. Id. at
1181–82 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
311. Id. at 1172 (majority opinion).
312. Id. See also supra notes 96–99, 107–09 and accompanying text for discussion on
preference of concealed versus open carry.
313. Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1172.
314. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 25450 (West Supp. 2014) (peace officers), § 25455
(retired peace officers), § 25620 (military personnel), § 25650 (retired federal officers),
§ 26035 (on private property or place of business), § 26040 (where hunting is allowed),
§ 26045 (when faced with “immediate, grave danger” in the “brief interval before and after
the local law enforcement agency . . . has been notified of the danger and before the arrival
of its assistance”), § 26050 (attempting to make a lawful arrest).
315. Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1169.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 1148.
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distinguish [himself] from the mainstream.”318 Thus, San Diego County’s
heightened permit requirement “impermissibly infringe[d] on the Second
Amendment right to bear arms in lawful self-defense.”319
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuit’s
determinations that their respective state’s heightened requirements were
substantially related to governmental interests.320 The court offered two
reasons why these circuits inappropriately applied intermediate scrutiny.321
First, their analyses were “near-identical to the freestanding ‘interestbalancing inquiry’” explicitly rejected by the majority in Heller.322
According to the Ninth Circuit, the courts improperly relied on the
“legislatures’ determinations weighing the government’s interest in public
safety against an individual’s interest in his Second Amendment right to
bear arms.”323 Second, the circuit courts deferred to the state legislature too
readily.324 The Ninth Circuit asserted that the Second, Third, and Fourth
Circuits misinterpreted and misapplied their citation to Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC325 “for the proposition that courts must
afford deference to legislative findings.”326 The Ninth Circuit explained
that Turner instructs courts to apply deference only when determining
whether a “real harm” exists that amounts to an “important government[al]
interest.”327 But when “assessing ‘the fit between the asserted interests and
the means chosen to advance them’” (i.e., prong two of the Marzzarella
test), the Turner court did not afford the legislature such deference.328
Instead, the Court required the state to “prove that the statute did not burden
the right ‘substantially more . . . than is necessary to further [the
government’s legitimate] interests.’”329 The Ninth Circuit asserted that in

318. Id. at 1169 (internal quotation marks omitted).
319. Id. at 1179.
320. See id. at 1175–78 (critiquing Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013); Woollard
v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81
(2d Cir. 2012)). Recall that the Second Circuit concluded it “owed ‘substantial deference to
the predictive judgments of [the legislature]’ regarding the degree of fit between the
regulations and the public interest they aimed to serve.” Id. at 1176 (alteration in original)
(quoting Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 97). The Third Circuit “deferred to the legislature’s
judgment that the permitting regulations would serve its interest in ensuring public safety
even though ‘New Jersey [could not] present[] [the court] with much evidence to show how
or why its legislators arrived at this predictive judgment.’” Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting Drake, 724 F.3d at 437). The Fourth Circuit “relied on the legislature’s judgment
that ‘reduc[ing] the number of handguns carried in public’ would increase public safety and
prevent crime, despite conflicting evidence on the issue.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting
Woollard, 712 F.3d at 879–82).
321. See id. at 1176–77.
322. Id. at 1176 (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35, 689–90
(2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
323. Id. (citing Drake, 724 F.3d at 439; Woollard, 712 F.3d at 880; Kachalsky, 701 F.3d
at 100).
324. Id. at 1177.
325. 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
326. Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1177.
327. Id. (citing Turner, 520 U.S. at 195).
328. Id. (quoting Turner, 520 U.S. at 213) (emphasis added).
329. Id. (quoting Turner, 520 U.S. at 214) (alteration in original).
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all three circuit courts, the state failed to satisfy this burden, and the
heightened permit requirements should have been held unconstitutional.330
In the end, the Ninth Circuit held that because a citizen’s ability to carry
firearms in public was restricted by a dual regulation (i.e., heightened
requirements for concealed carry permits and full ban on open carry), a
citizen in effect had no ability to carry firearms in public.331 Thus, the good
cause requirement, as interpreted by San Diego County, was found
unconstitutional.332
2. Seventh Circuit: Dismantling a Wholesale Ban
The Seventh Circuit in Moore v. Madigan found that Illinois’s law
regarding carrying firearms in public, which in effect constituted a “flat
ban,” was an unconstitutional burden on the Second Amendment.333 This
law differed significantly from those discussed in the previous four cases,
as the statute did not include a heightened permit requirement per se.
Rather, the statute at issue here was reminiscent of the District of
Columbia’s stringent law at issue in Heller.334 Judge Posner acknowledged
that the state faced a high burden in justifying such a Draconian law.335
The court referenced a previous case, United States v. Skoien,336 in which
the government had to make a “strong showing” that a restriction on
firearm possession was essential, and not merely a rational means, for
protecting public safety.337 The state in Moore had a greater burden for this
showing than in Skoien, where the regulation curtailed gun rights of
individuals convicted of domestic violence;338 here, the regulation curtailed
the rights of “the entire law-abiding adult population of Illinois.”339 Given
the stringency of this statute, the court rejected adopting a particular level of
scrutiny.340 Rather, a restriction with the breadth of Illinois’s law had to be

330. See id. at 1177–78.
331. See supra notes 312–19 and accompanying text.
332. See Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1179.
333. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 940, 942 (7th Cir. 2012). See supra note 144
and accompanying text for summary of the Illinois statute.
334. The Illinois statute forbade a person from carrying a firearm in any location other
than his home or business, or in the home of another when invited, unless the firearm was
“broken down in a non-functioning state; or [was] not immediately accessible; or [was]
unloaded and enclosed in a case . . . .” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1(a)(4)(i)–(iii) (West
Supp. 2010), invalidated by Moore, 702 F.3d at 933.
335. See Moore, 702 F.3d at 940 (“[S]o substantial a curtailment of the right of armed
self-defense requires a greater showing of justification than merely that the public might
benefit on balance from such a curtailment, though there is no proof it would. In contrast,
when a state bans guns merely in particular places, such as public schools, a person can
preserve an undiminished right of self-defense by not entering those places; since that’s a
lesser burden, the state doesn’t need to prove so strong a need.”).
336. 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010).
337. See Moore, 702 F.3d at 940 (discussing Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641–44).
338. See Skoien, 614 F.3d at 639.
339. Moore, 702 F.3d at 940.
340. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
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upheld on a positive showing of legitimacy, not “merely on the ground that
it’s not irrational.”341
The parties presented empirical evidence in an attempt to illustrate the
connection between substantial firearm regulation and increased public
safety, but Judge Posner concluded that the relationship was unclear.342
Indeed, scholars have found no conclusive evidence from “national law
assessments, cross-national comparisons, and index studies” to determine
whether stringent firearm regulation is related to decreased violence.343
Some scholars have gone so far as to comment that even if the concealed
carry laws were weakened, it is unlikely that the net effect on crime would
be large.344 In addition, the court notes that minimal impact on public
safety would occur if courts invalidated restrictive permit requirements
because (1) gun possession is concentrated in rural and suburban areas
where crime rates are relatively low, (2) these populations are at a lower
risk of victimization than individuals in urban areas, and (3) permit holders
are at a relatively low risk of misusing guns.345 While Judge Posner
conceded that some studies found that an increase in gun ownership may
cause increased murder rates,346 he notes that the issue in Moore was not
ownership, but public carry.347 Furthermore, an increase in gun ownership
is not necessarily a consequence of allowing concealed carry.348
Ultimately, the court was unconvinced that “the empirical literature on the
effects of allowing the carriage of guns in public . . . establish[es] a
pragmatic defense of the Illinois law.”349
On the other hand, the dissent pointed out “the legislature acted within its
authority” when it enacted a ban, as opposed to a permitting system, on
concealed carry because empirical evidence, albeit conflicted, supported
this conclusion.350 Consistent with the deferential conclusions reached by
341. Moore, 702 F.3d at 939 (citing Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 701 (7th Cir.
2011)). The state had to provide the court with “more than merely a rational basis for
believing that its uniquely sweeping ban is justified by an increase in public safety.” Id. at
942.
342. See id. at 936–39.
343. Id. at 937 (quoting Robert A. Hahn et al., Firearms Laws and the Reduction of
Violence: A Systematic Review, 28 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 40, 59 (2005) (noting that the
net effect of crime rates by permitting the carry of firearms in public is inconclusive)).
344. Id. at 938 (citing Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig & Adam M. Samaha, Gun Control
After Heller: Threats and Sideshows from a Social Welfare Perspective, 56 UCLA L. REV.
1041, 1082 (2009)).
345. See id. at 937–38 (citing Cook, Ludwig & Samaha, supra note 344, at 1082).
346. See id. at 938 (citing Mark Duggan, More Guns, More Crime, 109 J. POL. ECON.
1086, 1106–07 (2001)).
347. See id.
348. See id. (citing Duggan, supra note 346, at 1106–07).
349. Id. at 939 (citing James Bishop, Hidden or on the Hip: The Right(s) to Carry After
Heller, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 922–23 (2012)).
350. Id. at 953 (Williams, J., dissenting). “[G]un possession by urban adults was
associated with a significantly increased risk of being shot in an assault.” Id. at 951 (citing
Charles C. Branas et al., Investigating the Link Between Gun Possession and Gun Assault, 99
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2034, 2037 (2009)). “[I]n states with broad concealed-carry laws there
is an increased chance that one will be a victim of violent crime.” Id. (referencing three
studies in particular).
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the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits, the dissent’s opinion stated that
“‘the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the
evidence’ does not prevent a finding from being supported by substantial
evidence.”351
However, the Seventh Circuit’s majority may not have been in absolute
disagreement with the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits, as Judge Posner
called upon the Illinois legislature to create a new gun law that imposed
reasonable limitations.352 The Seventh Circuit appeared partial to New
York’s “moderate [regulatory] approach” reviewed in Kachalsky v. County
of Westchester.353 The Seventh Circuit commented that other jurisdictions
found proper balance between individual rights and public safety by
“limit[ing] the right to carry a gun to responsible persons rather than to ban
public carriage altogether . . . .”354 New York, for example, placed the
burden on the applicant to demonstrate a particularized need.355 Because
the court believed that some statute was necessary to regulate the state’s
firearm regime, the court stayed its mandate for 180 days and directed the
legislature to enact a new law that would “impose reasonable limitations,
consistent with the public safety and the Second Amendment as interpreted
in this opinion, on the carrying of guns in public.”356 The Illinois
legislature enacted a new law in 2013.357 However, this licensing scheme
may not have been the regulation Judge Posner had in mind when endorsing
“reasonable limitations” because the new statute imposes no heightened
permit requirement.358
IV. TAKING AIM AT THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
OF THE CIRCUIT COURTS’ DECISIONS
This part evaluates and critiques the analysis of the circuit courts in their
decisions regarding concealed carry permit requirements. One common
theme emerges: courts must defer to legislative policy decisions only after
exercising critical judgment and not blindly rely on legislatures’
determinations. A key strategy for exercising critical judgment is to
demand that the legislature put forth empirical evidence that the state may
use to satisfy its burden of proof. A citizen’s Second Amendment right
should not be restricted for the sake of public safety unless empirical
evidence demonstrates that this infringement benefits the greater public.
351. Id. at 952 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 211 (1997)); see
also Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 98–99 (2d Cir. 2012) (acknowledging
various studies on the relationship between handgun access, violent crime, safety, and
character of public places before noting “[i]t is the legislature’s job, not ours, to weigh
conflicting evidence and make policy judgments”).
352. Moore, 702 F.3d at 942 (majority opinion). See supra notes 146–48 and
accompanying text discussing the permit requirement after Moore.
353. See Moore, 702 F.3d at 940–41 (discussing Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 81).
354. Id. at 940.
355. Id. at 941.
356. Id. at 942.
357. See Firearm Concealed Carry Act, 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 66/10 (West 2014).
358. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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This Note does not assert that the judiciary itself should embark on a
policy inquiry over the benefit or harm of firearm restriction, but rather that
the judiciary should hold state legislatures accountable for their policy
considerations.
The Third Circuit decision of Drake v. Filko illustrates an instance where
the court blindly deferred to the legislature and ignored precedents dictating
that the burden of proof is on the state to demonstrate that the statute’s
restriction is reasonably linked to public safety.359 The New Jersey
legislature offered no evidence that a justifiable need requirement in the
state’s concealed carry statute would enhance public safety, and thus the
state was unable to satisfy its burden of proof.360 However, the court still
deferred to the legislative finding.361 The dissent pointed out that this
deference was completely unwarranted and that the court was remiss in its
duties by accepting the state’s argument without question.362 The state bore
the burden of proof363 but failed to present an ounce of evidence to support
the link between a “justifiable need” requirement and public safety, yet the
court still upheld the statute.364
The Fourth Circuit, on the other hand, deferred to the legislature after the
state proffered legitimate reasons based on empirical evidence for the
legislature’s policy decision.365 The Maryland legislature had codified
findings to defend the “good and substantial reason” requirement for
obtaining a concealed carry permit, demonstrating that the House gave
significant thought to its policy decision.366 The court undertook a
thorough analysis of the concealed carry statute and applied a textbook
intermediate scrutiny analysis to ultimately find the law constitutional.367
Similarly, the Second Circuit deferred to the legislature only after
acknowledging that empirical research was inadequate to invalidate the
current law.368 The state satisfied its burden by demonstrating that a
relationship existed between the “proper cause” requirement and public
safety.369 Because both of these courts explicitly adopted intermediate
scrutiny, the state did not face an extremely high hurdle in order to justify
its laws. Nonetheless, the courts adequately scrutinized the legislatures’
decisions, ensuring that citizens’ Second Amendment rights were burdened
to the least extent possible.
The Seventh Circuit also considered empirical evidence in favor of
restricting concealed carry but came to the opposite conclusion—that the
359. See supra note 299 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 222, 291 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 292–97 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 298–304 and accompanying text.
363. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
364. See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 259–60 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 251–55 and accompanying text.
367. See supra Part III.B.2. The court first identified whether public safety was a
legitimate state interest and then determined whether the heightened permit requirement was
substantially related to this interest.
368. See supra notes 244–45 and accompanying text.
369. See supra notes 243–45 and accompanying text.
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statute banning concealed carry was unconstitutional.370 However, these
circuit court decisions are not irreconcilable; the stringency of Illinois’s
statute was the determinative factor in it being found unconstitutional
because the state would have had to provide very compelling evidence to
justify a wholesale ban on public carry.371 The concealed carry statute was
simply too restrictive to justify for the sake of public safety.372 Despite the
fact that a simplistic analysis could have invalidated this law, Judge Posner
chose to consider research presented by both parties.373 Ultimately, reliable
evidence demonstrating a positive relationship between concealed carry and
violence did not exist to justify a complete ban on carrying firearms in
public. Had the Seventh Circuit’s concealed carry statute not been a
wholesale ban on firearms in public but rather a “proper cause” or
“justifiable need” requirement found in other circuits, it is quite possible
that the Seventh Circuit would have found such a statute constitutional.374
The Ninth Circuit’s outcome was most similar to the Seventh Circuit in
that it invalidated San Diego County’s concealed carry regulation;375
however, the opinion in fact is an outlier among the cases reviewed in this
Note because the Ninth Circuit approached the challenge to a concealed
carry law in a fundamentally different way. Rather than viewing the
Second Amendment right as one that may be infringed for the sake of
public safety, the court did not consider any state interest at all. By not
engaging in any level of constitutional scrutiny, the court had no potential
to identify any important government end.376 Furthermore, California is not
the only jurisdiction explicitly prohibiting open carry, a determinative fact
in the court’s holding that restrictions on concealed carry were
unconstitutional.377 New York, for example, also prohibited open carry, so
it is curious why California placed such great emphasis on this restriction
while the Second Circuit found it insignificant. It may stem from a
fundamentally different understanding of the Second Amendment
altogether. The Ninth Circuit’s holding implies that all law-abiding citizens
have the right to carry a firearm in public if they desire to do so,378 while
the Second Circuit is willing to compromise a citizen’s right if it enhances
public safety.379 Because of this belief, the Ninth Circuit did not consider
370. See supra Part III.C.2.
371. See supra notes 337–43 and accompanying text; see also Young, supra note 193, at
63.
372. See supra notes 339–49 and accompanying text.
373. See supra notes 342–49 and accompanying text.
374. See supra notes 353–56 and accompanying text. Judge Posner states that New
York’s proper cause requirement struck a proper balance between individual rights and
public safety. See supra note 354 and accompanying text.
375. See supra Part III.C.1.
376. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
377. Two other states considered in this Note also prohibit open carry of firearms: New
York and Illinois. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(2) (McKinney 2008) (permitting system
did not have a category allowing for open carry); see also 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
66/10(c)(1) (West 2014) (allowing individual with a license to carry a loaded or unloaded
firearm fully or partially concealed only).
378. See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
379. See supra Part III.B.1.
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evidence in support of a heightened restriction and in fact criticized the
other circuits for deferring to the state legislatures.380
A legislature’s assessment of empirical evidence will help legitimize its
policy decision to impose a particular restriction. Bolstering a legislative
decision with factual data better equips a court to assess the
constitutionality of such a statute. Moreover, a court that holds the
legislature to a high standard by requiring justification for its decision
ensures an appropriate level of legislative deference. While the court
should not impose its own judgment upon policy decisions reserved for the
legislature, it is important for courts to retain their analytic integrity and
exercise a degree of skepticism when evaluating a legislature’s reasoning
for adopting such a statute. Research conflicts over the issue of gun control
and public safety; however, courts’ thorough review of a legislature’s
decisions increases the chance that Second Amendment rights will only be
infringed when such regulation does in fact enhance public safety.
CONCLUSION
After Heller’s landmark decision establishing the Second Amendment’s
individual right to bear arms for self-defense in the home,381 lower courts
have struggled to interpret this holding for application to the vast frontier
outside of the home. In the case of concealed firearms, five circuit courts
have spoken on the constitutionality of statutory restrictions on concealed
carry, with three of them finding that heightened requirements for obtaining
a permit are constitutional.382 However, with many similar challenges
brewing in lower courts, it remains to be seen whether the trend of
validating such regulations will continue.

380. See supra notes 324–30 and accompanying text.
381. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
382. See supra Part III.B.

